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EMPIRICISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONDITIONS IN THE EVOLUTION OF
THE POLICE POWER: A MODEL FOR
DEFINITIONAL SCRUTINY
SCOTT M. REZNICK*
The states' police power has traditionally been the governmental
power least definable in nature and limitable in scope. It has, therefore,
been the power most subject to potential legislative abuse. As both the
embodiment of residual sovereignty1 and "the expression of social,
economic and political conditions," 2 it has proved incapable of endur-
ing, comprehensive definition. 3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School--Camden; A.B., 1968, Brandeis
University; J.D., 1973, The University of Chicago.
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 307 (A. Hamilton 1864 ed.). See Hastings, The Devel-
opment of the Law as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the Police Power of the State,
39 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC'y 359-78 (1900). U.S. CONST. amend. X
reserves the police power to the states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
2. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 3 (1904). Professor Freund stated:
[A] detailed examination of statutes and decisions . . . will reveal the police
power not as a fixed quantity, but as the expression of social, economic and
political conditions. As long as these conditions vary, the police power must
continue to be elastic, i.e., capable of development.
Id.
3. Defined generally as the power to promote and protect the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare, it "must be from its very nature. . . incapable of any very
exact definition . . . ." The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872)
(opinion of Miller, J.), discussed in text at notes 150-55 infra. In Commonwealth v. Alger,
61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851), discussed in text at notes 57-63 infra, Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw attempted the first comprehensive definition of the police power. See L. LEVY, THE
LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 247-54 (1957). In describing the
difficulty of such an attempt, he stated: "It is much easier to perceive and realize the...
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The doctrinal history and development of the police power indicate,
however, that the judiciary has explicitly delineated the scope of the
power by assessing the responsiveness of a legislative enactment to
prevailing social and economic conditions. This substantive link between
the legislature's authority to regulate and contemporary conditions has
been an independent means of defining the power's scope and cir-
cumscribing its applicability. Herein denominated the principle of condi-
tions, it has served as a fountainhead standard of constitutional review in
the evolution of the police power. In its most fundamental explication,
the principle of conditions holds: To be constitutionally authorized and,
therefore, valid, a police power enactment, in general and as applied,
must be responsive to prevailing social or economic conditions at the
time of its constitutional assessment.
The principle of conditions is a substantive component in a broader
historical category of constitutional scrutiny through which the judiciary
has given content to the phrase public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. This intrinsic or definitional scrutiny reflects an attempt to
comprehend the power's scope without analytical reliance on private
constitutional rights. That is, an interface between governmental powers
and individual rights exists, whereby setting the scope of one necessarily
sets the breadth of the other. Definitional scrutiny represents a means of
independently defining the police power so that it may then be balanced
against an allegedly infringed constitutional right. The extent of infringe-
ment may be measured by taking issue, equal protection, due process,
first amendment or similar analyses. Definitional scrutiny has thus been
used either alone or with a rational relationship or balancing test to assess
the constitutionality of police power enactments.
Definitional scrutiny has historically included substantive principles in
addition to the principle of conditions. During its early manifestations
and throughout the nineteenth century, definitional scrutiny incorporated
a substantive component derived from the common law of nuisance-the
sources of this power, than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise." 61
Mass. (7 Cush.) at 85.
A more recent statement of the indefinable nature of the police power is in Justice
Douglas' opinion in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), discussed in text at notes
363-65 infra:
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each
case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of
legislative determinations . . ..
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maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas .4 Under this maxim, courts
limited the states' use of the police power to the prospective prevention
of harms (negative externalities) to the community and its inhabitants.
Industrialization and urbanization and the concomitant expansion of the
power into an affirmative authority capable of generating social benefits
as well as preventing social harms necessarily eliminated the sic utere
component from substantive definitional scrutiny.
Manipulations of the presumption of constitutionality under defi-
nitional scrutiny have ranged from virtually irrebuttable presumptions of
validity to inverse presumptions requiring the state to advance compel-
ling reasons to justify the enactment. Generally, however, a middle-level
rebuttable presumption favoring constitutionality has been applied.
Though the degree of judicial deference used in applying this favorable
presumption has not been entirely consistent or predictable, the courts
have tended to scrutinize the existence of legislative authority to regulate
more closely than the choice of legislative policy.
This article explores the development and consequences of the applica-
tion of the principle of conditions in and to the evolution of the police
power. It divides that evolution into three segments. The first, concen-
trating on initial state court developments, traces the police power from
its common law roots to the Supreme Court's Munn v. Illinois5 decision
in 1876. The second period, commencing with Munn, details the impact
of industrialization and urbanization on the scope of the power. It
encompasses the emergence of a comprehensive, affirmative police pow-
er and a concomitantly heightened tension between governmental power
and private rights in property. This tension, crossing a number of doctrin-
al lines, produced some of the most interesting and contradictory subsets
of cases in the evolution of the police power. The third segment begins
with the Depression and continues through the decisions of the Burger
Court. Following a significant transitional period during the 1930s, in
which the principle of conditions played an important role in sanctioning
legislative response to the chaotic social and economic conditions, the
contemporary period is characterized by both a conclusive presumption
of constitutionality that precludes due process scrutiny and a continued,
though infrequent, use of the principle of conditions under the contract
clause.
4. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (4th ed. 1968).
5. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
Number I1]
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At the conclusion of this historical analysis, the article proposes a
normative model of definitional scrutiny. Denominated authorization
scrutiny, this model is an attempt to manipulate the presumption of
constitutionality through a range of middle level alternatives by means of
objectifiable, mechanical triggers and thereby to incorporate change in
social and economic conditions into the constitutional definition of the
police power.
I. 1789-1876: ORIGINS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICE
POWER: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOURCE AND SCOPE
The development of the police power during the first three-quarters of
the nineteenth century may be characterized as the juxtaposition of
constitutional notions of residual sovereignty with the common law
concepts of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas6 and overruling necessi-
ty. Differential stress on these constitutional and common law origins
6. For a comprehensive analysis of the English and American development of the sic
utere maxim, see Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the State
Police Power, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 276 (1936). Smead explicitly placed the source of the
police power in both the Tenth Amendment and the sic utere maxim: "At the basis of the
police power, reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, is the common law maxim enjoining one to use his property in such a way as
not to injure that of another." Id. at 276. Moreover, the evolution and expansion of the
application of the maxim was predicated upon changing conditions: "Probably the most
important cause for these changes in the meaning given to the maxim by the common law
courts was the developing economic system. Along with urban growth and the onslaught
of the commercial and industrial revolutions, property was being used in different ways."
Id. at 282-83. Corwin likewise characterized the maxim:
[Tihe police power was often grounded upon the common-law maxim sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, a definition of which like the historical definition bore
with it the possible implication that the police power was a peculiar kind of
power, exercisable constitutionally only for peculiar ends.
Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366,
479 (1911) (footnote omitted).
Hastings described both the maxim and overruling necessity as the source of the
police power. He believed, however, that neither principle was sufficient foundation for
the power. Hastings, supra note I, at 414-16. Chancellor Kent, on the other hand, found
the principles underlying sic utere to provide the essential underpinnings for regulatory
authority. His categorization of activities subject to control evidences the common law
heritage of the power:
Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the
deposit of powder, the application of steam power to propel cars, the building
with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all be interdicted by
law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational
principle, that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his
neighbors, and that private interests must be made subservient to the general
interests of the community.
2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES* 340 (footnote omitted).
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generated distinct federal and state court conceptualizations of the pow-
er's scope.
The Supreme Court, assessing the validity of police power enactments
under the contract7 and commerce clauses, 8 recognized doctrinal princi-
ples supportive of an expansive power. Of particular significance were
those contract clause cases that recognized rudiments of the principle of
conditions and those commerce clause cases that equated the power's
scope with the broad, inherently uncircumscribed, scope of residual
sovereignty. Concomitant with these developments, the Court estab-
lished a presumption of constitutionality as a component of judicial
review. 9
The state courts regarded the power as more tightly defined and
circumscribed than did their federal counterparts. These courts, particu-
larly after mid-century, viewed the police power as encompassing pros-
pective legislative authority to protect the rights of the community as well
as those of neighboring individual property owners. These principles,
derived from the common law of nuisance, limited the content of the
power and the nature of the relationship subject to legislative control.
Coupled with the principle of conditions, they provided the analytical
components of definitional scrutiny as applied by the early state courts.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. "No State shall. . . pass any. . .Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts .... "
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power. . .To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes
Prior to the passage of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the Supreme Court limited its
police power scrutiny to contract clause issues. This resulted largely from its decision in
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833), holding the first eight
amendments of the Bill of Rights inapplicable to the states. See Corwin, The Supreme
Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 644 (1909).
9. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810), Chief Justice Marshall
stated:
The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is,
at all times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be
decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case. The court, when impelled by duty
to render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station, could it be unmind-
ful of the solemn obligations which that station imposes. But it is not on slight
implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have
transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The opposition
between the constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear
and strong convictiord of their incompatibility with each other.
Justice Washington voiced similar sentiments in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213, 270 (1827), and Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 93-94 (1823). See Cushman,
Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court, 19 MICH. L. REV. 771, 773-76
(1921).
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A. Early Federal Developments: The Contract and Commerce Clauses
Early nineteenth century contract clause cases characteristically in-
volved an assessment of the degree to which vested rights in property
circumscribed the police power.1° Among the most significant of these
were Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward" and Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge,'2 in which the Supreme Court examined the
relationship between the state and its chartered corporations. The Court's
analyses, by Chief Justices Marshall and Taney respectively, focused on
the content of the corporate charter and its status as a protected
contract.13 Neither Marshall nor Taney questioned the source of the
police power or examined its constitutional scope. Marshall, however,
recognized in dicta that the state could not necessarily be bound by
contract to the laws prevailing when a company was enfranchised. To do
so would "render immutable those civil institutions, which are estab-
lished for purposes of internal government, and which, to subserve those
purposes, ought to vary with varying circumstances." 14 Taney also
recognized the nexus between the existence of authority and govern-
ment's ability to respond to changing conditions:
[I]n a country like ours, free, active, and enterprising, continually
advancing in numbers and wealth; new channels of communication are
daily found necessary, both for travel and trade; and are essential to
10. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), Chief Justice Marshall first
linked vested rights and the contract clause. This linkage was upheld in Dartmouth
College and, to a limited extent, repudiated in Charles River Bridge (discussed in text at
notes 11-16 infra). See Corwin, supra note 6, at 379. See also Scheiber, The Road to
Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5
PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 376-78 (1971).
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
12. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
13. The views of the two Chief Justices with regard to these contract clause issues
were largely antithetical. In characterizing the impact of Taney's opinion on the doctrine
established by Marshall in Dartmouth College, Professor Corwin stated:
[I]n his great Charles River Bridge decision. . . Taney laid down the maxim that
in a public grant nothing passes by implication, a doctrine which. . . would have
made the decision in the Dartmouth College case originally impossible, and
which did in point of fact, in the decades following, pave the way for the great
but necessary curtailment of the efficacy of that decision.
Corwin, supra note 6, at 461 (footnotes omitted).
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 628. Later in the opinion, Marshall, referring to the
"in-violability" of the charter over time, stated: "Circumstances have not changed it. In
reason, in justice, and in law, it is now what it was in 1769." Id. at 643. By implication at
least, the charter's "inviolability" might have been suspect had conditions indeed
changed.
[Vol. 1978:1
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the comfort, convenience, and prosperity of the people. A state ought
never to be presumed to surrender this power .... 15
Marshall and Taney thereby recognized a component of the principle of
conditions: the preeminence of legislative authority in police power/con-
tract clause conflicts. 16
Early nineteenth century commerce clause cases extrinsically limited
the police power by articulating the breadth of Congress' delegated
authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Court found it sufficient in
these cases to merely recognize a general state authority to regulate its
internal affairs, 17 i.e., it recognized the residual sovereignty left to the
states after delegation of specific sovereign powers to the federal govern-
ment.
The Court began to conceptualize the scope of the police power as co-
extensive with that of sovereignty in Gibbons v. Ogden."8 In Gibbons,
Marshall described the police power variously as "that immense mass of
legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State,
not surrendered to the general government" 1 9 and as "[tlhe acknowl-
edged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to
govern its own citizens." 20 Thirteen years later in City of New York v.
15. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 547.
16. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879), discussed in text at notes 116-
21 infra.
17. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259,271 (1875), wherein the
Court, in resolving a police power/commerce clause issue, stated:
It is not necessary for the course of this discussion to attempt to define it [the
police power] more accurately than it has been defined already. It is not neces-
sary, because whatever may be the nature and extent of that power, where not
otherwise restricted, no definition of it, and no urgency for its use, can authorize
a state to exercise it in regard to a subject-matter which has been confided
exclusively to the discretion of Congress by the Constitution.
See also B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
PART II: THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 39 (1965). In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
210 (1824), discussed in text at notes 18-20 infra, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
[T]he Court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New-York [sic], as
expounded by the highest tribunal of that State, have, in their application to this
case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right
to which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist . . . the acts of New-
York [sic) must yield to the law of Congress ....
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
19. Id. at 203.
20. Id. at 208. One commentator advanced the hypothesis that Marshall's reference
to "police" was predicated upon Blackstone's broad definition of the police power as
incorporating the full range of sovereign power. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 37.
Blackstone defined the police power as
the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of
the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Miln,21 the Court established a comparably broad concept of state regula-
tory authority:
[I]t is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to
advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to
provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation,
which it may deem to be conducive to these ends .... 22
Chief Justice Taney confirmed the expansive nature of the police
power in The License Cases23 and The Passenger Cases .24 In the former,
Taney observed that the state's police powers "are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent
of its dominions. '" 5 In the latter, he defined the police power as "a
general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good
manners: and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective
stations.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 162.
21. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). See Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health,
118 U.S. 455 (1886).
22. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 138.
23. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). The License Cases were the first of a series of
Supreme Court cases relating to liquor regulation. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. I
(1888); Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Bartemeyerv. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129
(1873). See also R. MoTr, DuE PROCESS OF LAW 323 n.61 (1922) for an extensive listing of
these cases.
24. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 485 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). See Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875). The Henderson Court, although not directly
overruling The Passenger Cases, substantially eroded their precedential value. Neverthe-
less, Henderson did not disparage The Passenger Cases' explication of the police power.
Rather, in light of changing conditions, increased transportation of foreign passengers, the
scope of the Commerce Clause had expanded, precluding state regulation.
The Passenger Cases are of interest not only because the police power was broadly
defined, but also because Taney relied on the unique status of "the great commercial
emporium of New York," 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 485, and the changing nature of quarantine
methods to justify the law in question. Taney juxtaposed the traditional method of
quarantine developed prior to extensive international passenger travel with New York's
methods. The traditional method "was, no doubt, well suited to the state of the world at
the time when it was generally adopted; but can there be any reason why a state may not
adopt other sanitary regulations in the place of them, more suitable to the free, speedy,
and extended intercourse of modern times?" Id. at 487. It should be noted that this use of
the principle of changing conditions related to the means chosen to effectuate what was
clearly historically a permissible legislative purpose. Changed conditions was not used in
The Passenger Cases to alter the scope of the police power, but rather, to justify an
alteration in means.
25. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 583 (opinion of Taney, C.J.). The Chief Justice's opinion,
although conferring upon the police power a definition as broad as sovereign power, was,
nevertheless somewhat restrained when compared with those of a number of his collea-
gues on the Court. Justice McLean, for example, stated:
The States, resting upon their original basis of sovereignty, subject only to the
exceptions stated, exercise their powers over every thing connected with their
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss1/6
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power of self-preservation," 26 reserved to the states and never surren-
dered. Taney's explicit formulation of equivalence between the police
power and sovereign authority to protect against harms to the community
provided the basis for substantiating later expansion of regulatory au-
thority.27
B. Early State Development: Sic Utere and the Emerging Principle of
Conditions
Throughout the first three quarters of the nineteenth century the state
courts were intimately involved in articulating the nature and scope of
permissible state intervention into private economic activities. These
courts relied on two doctrines to support the state's power to regulate: the
principle of residual sovereignty and the common law maxim, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas. The concepts subsumed within the maxim
served as a definitional limitation on the scope of the power.
social and internal condition. A State regulates its domestic commerce,
contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and acts upon all
internal matters which relate to its moral and political welfare.
The acknowledged police power of a State extends often to the destruction of
property. A nuisance may be abated. Every thing prejudicial to the health or
morals of a city may be removed. . . . It is a power essential to self-preserva-
tion, and exists, necessarily in every organized community. It is, indeed, the law
of nature, and is possessed by man in his individual capacity.
Id. at 588 (opinion of McLean, J.).
26. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). As in The License Cases, Chief
Justice Taney's opinion is only one of a number of opinions broadly construing the police
power. Justice Wayne, for example, states: "What is the supreme police power of a state?
It is one of the different means used by sovereignty to accomplish that great object,'the
good of the state. . . . Police powers, then, and sovereign powers are the same." Id. at
423-24 (opinion of Wayne, J.).
27. See Corwin, supra note 6, at 461-62 (footnote omitted). Professor Corwin stated:
Taney diluted Marshall's doctrine of the paramountcy of national power within
the sphere of its competence with the doctrine of the reserved sovereignty of the
states, whereby he meant not merely that the states have left to them certain
powers in consequence of their not being granted to the national government,
which is all that the Tenth Amendment says, but that the states had an area of
power which was positively reserved to them and which therefore no legitimate
exercise of federal power could ever invade.
See also Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), Justice Rehnquist
resurrected Taney's notions of inviolable state sovereignty:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching
to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in
that manner.
Id. at 845. See generally 125 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1977).
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Sic utere is the fountainhead maxim from which both the common law
of nuisance and the police power arose. 28 As originally applied, sic utere
"operated to protect real property from what the courts thought were
injuries resulting from the use of another of his real property." 29 That is,
the courts used sic utere principles to resolve cost spillover conflicts30
between the existing uses of neighboring landowners. This relationship in
tort between property owners originally caused the maxim and the
emerging police power to be defined in terms of the prevention of harms.
The early nineteenth century state courts expanded the maxim's scope to
include protection of communal as well as property rights. This negative
power was a legislative analog to the judicial power to declare certain
noxious activities common law nuisances. It may be said that throughout
this period the state courts expanded the content of the maxim to include
protection of "the public health, safety and morals."
'Concomitant with the expansion of common law concepts into a
community-based prospective police power was the recognition of the
principle of conditions. Sic utere expanded was incapable of precise and
enduring definition. Just as it had been necessary to assess the physical
conditions surrounding a land use to determine whether it was a common
law nuisance in fact,31 so had it become necessary to assess prevailing
community conditions to determine the existence of legislative authority
to regulate. Moreover, as sic utere expanded to incorporate the rights of
the community, the breadth of social and economic conditions to be
analyzed also expanded. Thus, the principle of conditions, along with the
sic utere maxim, served as an essential component of the state courts'
early definitional limitation of regulatory authority.
28. See generally Smead, supra note 6.
29. Id. at 280. As Smead stated: "Thus the maxim came to mean, 'So use your own
real property in order that you do not injure the real property of another' and this was the
only meaning it had at the common law in this early period when the rights of property
were paramount." Id. Moreover, the English courts had tended to restrict the scope of the
maxim just prior to its adoption by the American judiciary. Id. at 282. Smead noted
elsewhere that the period in which Lord Coke gave the maxim its original authority was
characterized by "the existence of a stable society with rights and duties established and
with the relations between individuals undergoing no great changes." Id at 278.
30. Cost spillovers, also known as negative externalities, are widely recognized in
both economic and legal literature. See, e.g., M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION
IN THE UNITED STATES 166-87 (1971); A. PIQOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed.
1932); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. LAW. & ECON. 1 (1960); and articles cited at note 247 infra.
31. See C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 211 (2d ed. 1971).
See also J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 362 (2d ed. 1975).
[Vol. 1978:1
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1. Initial Opinions: Recognition of Sic Utere and the Principle of
Conditions
Vanderbilt v. Adams 32 and Coates v. Mayor of New York33 were
among the earliest and most significant state cases explicating the scope
of the police power. In each case, the New York Supreme Court upheld
regulatory authority on sovereignty grounds and used sic utere and the
principle of conditions to delineate its scope. Within that scope were both
the power to declare certain uses nuisances and the power to protect the
community from detrimental use of an individual's property.
Vanderbilt concerned the state's authority to regulate docking at
private wharves in New York City. The court found that general authori-
ty to regulate "rests on the implied right and duty of the supreme power
to protect all by statutory regulations, so that, on the whole, the benefit of
all is promoted.' 3 Generally beneficial enactments "do not proceed to
the length of impairing any right in the proper sense of that term.' '5
This general definition of the power to regulate the use of private
property did not, however, necessarily validate the harbor regulation in
issue. The court recognized that the statute was "essentially necessary
for the purpose of protecting the rights of all concerned,' '36 i.e., mitigat-
ing cost spillovers between competing uses and rivals for dock space.
Exercise of this power was necessary where justified by prevailing
conditions. Generally "a crowded population" supported the authority to
regulate. 37 More particularly, "where an extensive commerce is carried
on," and "[d]isorder and confusion would be the consequence, if there
was no control," '3 8 the authority to regulate existed.
Coates involved a New York City by-law that prohibited burials in
certain sections of the city. Within one of those sections, Trinity Church
held property limited by grant exclusively to cemetery use. Although
conceding under Vanderbilt that a municipality has "in general, power
to so order the use of private property in the city, as to prevent its proving
pernicious to the citizens generally," 39 plaintiffs nevertheless sought to
32. 7 Cow. 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
33. 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (decided with Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New
York in a single opinion).
34. 7 Cow. at 352.
35. Id. at 351.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 7 Cow. at 604.
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invalidate the ordinance as a taking. The Court acknowledged that
plaintiffs' property rights had been destroyed by the regulation but held
that the destruction was not an unconstitutional taking. The police power
could not be limited by the nature of a property grant, 4 which was
subject to sic utere principles. In the court's view "[e]very right. . . in
property . . . is purchased and holden subject to the restriction that it
shall be so exercised as not to injure others."41 Thus, the Court allocated
to the landowner the risk that a land use might over time prove noxious:
Though, at the time, it be remote and inoffensive, the purchaser is
bound to know, at his peril, that it may become otherwise by the
residence of many people in its vicinity; and that it must yield to by-
laws, or other regular remedies, for the suppression of nuisances. 42
As prevailing conditions changed, and particularly as population expand-
ed and densities increased, new laws became necessary. A previously
innocent use might become subject to regulation or prohibition. Compen-
sation need not be paid in such situations, for no property had been
taken.43 It was immaterial that the rights destroyed had vested prior to
passage of the enactment. 44
40. Id. at 605. The court stated: "[I]t cannot be that the mere form of the grant,
because the parties choose to make it particular, instead of general and absolute, should
prevent the use to which it is limited being regarded and treated as a nuisance, when it
becomes so in fact." Id.
In Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1826), the court had resolved a similar issue arising under the by-law in question in
Coates. The city's conveyance to the church contained the covenant for quiet enjoyment
in issue. The court held that the city, as lessor, was not liable when the city, as legislator,
prohibited a previously innocent use. The growth of population at increasing densities
proximate to the church threatened public health, necessitating the ordinance.
Sixty years ago, when the lease was made, the premises were beyond the
inhabited part of the city. . . . Now they are in the very heart of the city. When
the defendants [originally] covenanted. . . it never entered into the contempla-
tion of either party, that the health of the city might require the suspension, or
abolition of that right. It would be unreasonable in the extreme, to hold that the
plaintiffs should be at liberty to endanger . . . the lives . . . of the citizens
generally, because their lease contains a covenant for quiet enjoyment,
Id. at 542. The grantor, in such circumstances, was not liable to the grantee. Analogizing
to a traditional nuisance situation, the court stated:
Suppose these premises had been let for a certain purpose which is proper in
itself, in a detached situation, but a nuisance in a city thickly inhabited-for
instance, a slaughter house-could be seriously contended, that when the use of
the property in the way contemplated by the parties to the conveyance, was
forbidden by the legislature, an action would lie against the grantor?
Id.
41. Id. at 605.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 606.
44. Id. at 605.
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In ensuing years, changes in local conditions were also scrutinized to
determine the validity of police power enactments. Two Massachusetts
cases illustrate this point. In each case, the court considered population
density in assessing the enactment's constitutionality. In Vandine's
Case,4" the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a Boston ordinance
that prohibited the transportation of offal through city streets without a
license, noting: "To arrive at a correct decision whether the by-law be
reasonable or not, regard must be had to its object and necessity. Minute
regulations are required in a great city, which would be absurd in the
country.'"I
The court used similar reasoning in Austin v. Murray47 to invalidate a
Charlestown ordinance that prohibited burials noting that the regulation,
if "limited to the populous part of the town. . . would have been...
very reasonable. ' ' 8 Moreover, had increased population density pre-
vailed throughout the town, the legislature would have had authority to
enact the ordinance. Because those conditions did not exist, the court
invalidated the ordinance.
2. Tewksbury and Alger: Lemuel Shaw's Opinions and Their Progeny
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and its Chief Justice,
Lemuel Shaw, played a seminal role in the development of the police
power and evolution of the principle of conditions. In two opinions
upholding regulation of riparian rights, Commonwealth v. Tewksbury49
and Commonwealth v. Alger,' Shaw provided the first comprehensive
conceptualization and definition of the police power. In Tewksbury,
Shaw held that the legislature was competent to exercise the police
power, defined as the sic utere maxim expanded to include public rights,
in appropriate circumstances. In Alger, he comprehensively defined and
enlarged the police power, expanded the application of the principle of
conditions into a method of analyzing general legislative authority to
regulate, and conferred judicial imprimatur on the transition of a
common law nuisance system into a legislative system of prospective
regulation."1
45. 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 187 (1828).
46. Id. at 191.
47. 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 121 (1834).
48. Id. at 125.
49. 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846).
50. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
51. Shaw's opinion in Alger, by expanding the legislature's power to regulate and
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Tewksbury involved a statute that prohibited the removal of sand and
gravel from beach areas. Plantiff landowner claimed the statute as ap-
plied was an unconstitutional taking. 52 After noting that the legislature is
competent "to declare an indifferent act injurious to the public," 53 Shaw
held the statute valid as applied. In assessing the police power's scope,
he explicitly utilized sic utere expanded to protect the general communi-
ty:
All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others, or to destroy or
greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community; under
the maxim of the common law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 54
An enactment protective of community rights was within the scope of the
police power and, therefore, was not an unconstitutional deprivation of
private property rights. Those rights, traditionally held subject to the
property rights of others, were now also subject to the community's right
of self-protection.
Even sic utere expanded, however, could not justify a legislative
declaration of nuisance status absent justifying social or economic condi-
tions.55 Appropriate circumstances were essential to an exercise of gov-
ernmental power:
But there are many cases where the things done in particular places, or
under a particular state of facts, would be injurious, when, under a
making it subject to the test of prevailing conditions, confirmed the transition of regula-
tory power from a common law system of nuisances, applicable only subsequent to
entrepreneurial investment, into a prospective statutory system which provided some
certainty to potential investors. It is difficult, indeed, to divorce Shaw's justification of
this transition from an assessment of then prevailing social and economic conditions and
trends; notably, increased urbanization and fledgling industrialization. Shaw, himself,
detailed the need for "fain authoritative rule, carrying with it the character of certainty
and precision . . . . The tradesman needs to know, before incurring expense, ...
builders of houses need to know . . . . This requisite certainty and precision can only be
obtained by a positive enactment. . . ." Id. at 96-97. He also noted: "[I]t seems to us
highly important to have a more precise and definite law made and promulgated, by which
all persons may more certainly know their own and the public rights, and govern them-
selves accordingly." Id. at 103. This advancement of police power doctrine beyond the
traditional common law of nuisances is examined in L. LEVY, supra note 3, at 251-53. For
an analysis of contemporary social and economic development, see generally THE CITY IN
AMERICAN LiFE: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY (P. Kramer & F. Holborn eds. 1970); C.
GLABB & A. BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA (1967); A. WEBER, THE GROWTH OF
CITES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1899).
52. 52 Mass. (11 Met.) at 56.
53. Id. See Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 1 (1854).
54. 52 Mass. (11 Met.) at 57.
55. See id. at 57-58.
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change of circumstances, the same would be quite harmless ...
[W]e think it is competent for the legislature to interpose, and by
positive enactment to prohibit a use of property which would be
injurious to the public, under particular circumstances, leaving the use
of similar property unlimited, where the obvious considerations of
public good do not require the restraint.5 6
Thus, responsiveness to local conditions coupled with a legislative objec-
tive to preserve community rights became predicates to the exercise of
regulatory authority.
Alger, decided five years after Tewksbury, was the most significant
state court police power opinion rendered in the nineteenth century. 7 In
it, Shaw comprehensively defined the police power as
vested in the legislature by the constitution . to make, ordain and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. 8
Having thus established legislative power to regulate for the common
good, Shaw then constructed limitations to its exercise: 59 "In considering
this question, it becomes necessary to inquire, and ascertain as far as
practicable, the nature and character of the laws in question, and the
object which the legislature had in view in passing them."6
Shaw held that the object of the challenged statute, to prevent obstruc-
tion to navigation in Boston harbor, fell within the scope of permissible
regulation. Reaffirming the expanded sic utere principle promulgated in
56. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
57. Shaw's definition of the police power in Alger was the most frequently cited
during this period. See L. LEVY, supra note 3, at 247-54; Hastings, supra note 1, at 418.
See also T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 572-73 (1868), and
cases cited therein at 573 n. 1.
58. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 85. Professor Corwin views the linkage between Shaw's
definition and the nature of the general constitutional grant of power as one of "a number
of restrictive principles" which are subsumed within due process.
[T]he Massachusetts Supreme Court, owing to the formula by which power is
vested by the Massachusetts constitution in the legislature to pass "all manner of
wholesome and reasonable" laws, had never ceased to describe the police
power, even when according it the broadest possible field of operation, as a
power of "reasonable" legislation . ...
Corwin, supra note 6, at 478.
59. Shaw recognized the inherent difficulty in this task: "It is much easier to perceive
and realize the existence and sources of this power, than to mark its boundaries, or
prescribe limits to its exercise." 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 85.
60. Id. at 83.
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Tewksbury, but finding heretofore unstated justification for it in the
purposes of sovereignty, he stated:
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that
his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. 61
Shaw also relied on Tewksbury to link the scope of the power to
prevailing local conditions. A use innocent in one location could be
noxious and subject to regulation in another. 6 He moved beyond the
"taking" context in Tewksbury, however, and predicated general legis-
lative authority to regulate on responsiveness to prevailing conditions,
with authority to assess those conditions allocated to the legislature and
protected by a presumption of constitutionality:
Whether any restraint upon the use of land is necessary to the preser-
vation of common rights and the public security, must depend upon
circumstances, to be judged of by those to whom all legislative power
is intrusted by the sovereign authority of the state, so to declare and
regulate as to secure and preserve all public rights. 63
Subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions independently reaffirmed
the principles promulgated by Chief Justice Shaw in Tewksbury and
Alger. Principal among these were Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington
Railroad' in Vermont, and State v. Paul6" in Rhode Island. In neither
case did the court expound as fully upon the police power as had the
Massachusetts Chief Justice; yet each reaffirmed Shaw's concept of the
power.
61. Id. at 84-85.
62. Id. at 87-88.
63. Id. at 88. Later in the opinion Shaw linked location with the degree of protection
to private property rights, finding a higher degree of community interest in land of peculiar
significance:
And so in the exercise of the more general power of government, so to
restrain the injurious use of property, it seems to apply more significantly and
more directly to real estate thus situated on the seashore, separating the upland
from the sea, to which the public have a common and acknowledged right, so that
such estate should be held subject to somewhat more restrictive regulations in its
use, than interior and upland estate remote from places in which the public have
a common right. The circumstances are different.
Id. at 94-95.
64. 27 Vt. 140 (1854).
65. 5 R.I. 185 (1858). See State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. 497 (1858).
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Chief Justice Redfield's opinion in Thorpe has been cited with Alger
as a seminal case in the evolution of the police power. 66 At issue was a
statute requiring railroads to fence their rights-of-way. The railroad
asserted that the statute impaired its charter rights. The court, however,
held corporate charters subject to police power regulation. The legisla-
ture could not be deprived of the power to regulate "even by express
grant to any mere public or private corporation."67
Redfield found the source of the police power in sovereignty and relied
on principles inherent in sic utere to delineate its permissable scope:
[The police power] extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property
within the state. According to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which being of universal application, it must of course, be
within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own as not to injure others.'
Moreover, Redfield made explicit the presumption of constitutionality
found only by implication in Alger: "[I]n all doubtful cases their [the
legislature's] judgment is final . ... 6
Chief Justice Ames' opinion in Paul served a pivotal role in a long
series of cases upholding regulation of the manufacture and sale of
spiritous liquors against substantive due process/vested rights chal-
lenge. 70 Ames held that the police power, as an attribute of sovereignty,71
66. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, supra note 57, at 574-76 n.2; Hastings, supra note 1, at 423.
67. 27 Vt. at 149. Judge Cooley cited Thorpe to support the general proposition that
vested contract rights are subject to police power regulation:
All contracts and all rights, it is held, are subject to this power; and regulations
which affect them may not only be established by the State, but must also be
subject to change from time to time, with reference to the general well-being of
the community, as circumstances change, or as experience demonstrates the
necessity.
T. COOLEY, supra note 57, at 574 (footnote omitted). Redfield's opinion, however, re-
ferred only in a limited way to responsiveness analysis. He found that railroads, if
'specially dangerous," were subject to the same regulations and expense as "required of
natural persons under such circumstances." 27 Vt. at 150.
68. 27 Vt. at 149.
69. Id. at 150.
70. See R. MOTT, supra note 23, at 319 n.57. Mott gives an extensive listing of cases
related to the regulation of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors at 319-26
nn.57-63. Both Mott and Corwin recognize Paul as a principal case in opposition to the
notions of substantive due process initially advanced in Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y.
378 (1856), discussed in text at notes 87-96 infra. R. MoTr, supra note 23, at 319 & n.57;
Corwin, supra note 6, at 471-77.
71. 5 R.I. at 193 (citing The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 572 (1847), discussed in
text at notes 23-27 supra).
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was directly derived from and amendatory of the common law.72 As such
it was necessarily responsive to changes in social and economic condi-
tions:
[T]his power exists in great part for the very purpose of changing the
[common law] adjustment [among property and community rights]
from time to time, as the relative circumstances of the community and
individuals may 'require. Our regulations of internal police and of
trade, [are] adapted by positive law to our condition, and changed by it
according to our changing circumstances .... 73
Furthermore, a police power enactment, at least as to the legislative
choice of means, was subject to a presumption of validity. 74
Alger and its progeny indicated that the police power was sufficiently
elastic to meet changing social and economic conditions. Both sic utere
and the principle of conditions were components of its constitutional
scope. On occasion, the courts found no justifying conditions and in-
validated police power enactments. The Illinois Supreme Court rendered
two such decisions,75 each involving the regulation of cemeteries in the
town of Lake View. The initial enactment prohibited burials within the
town's jurisdiction. Distinguishing between nuisances per se and nui-
sances in fact,76 the court held that, in the absence of actual conditions
which render cemeteries noxious, the legislature was without power to
regulate. Because Lake View was a rural community, it lacked the power
either to declare cemeteries nuisances or to prohibit them.
In response to this decision, the town enacted a regulation which
limited the location of cemeteries. This regulation, however, was also
invalidated as unresponsive to prevailing conditions. Relying on the
dynamic nature of the principle of conditions,77 the court found no basis
for justifying the ordinance in either the cemetery's location or the town's
growth in the foreseeable future. 78 Moreover, the rights of the cemetery
owners had vested prior to the enactment of the ordinance. The court held
72. 5 R.I. at 191.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 192-93.
75. Town of Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70111. 191 (1873); Town of Lake
View v. Letz, 44 Ill. 81 (1867). See Toledo, Wabash & W. Ry. v. Jacksonville, 67 III. 37
(1873).
76. 44 Ill. at 83. "There are some things which in their nature are nuisances, and
which the law recognizes as such. There are others which may or may not be so, their
character in this respect depending on circumstances."
77. 70 III. at 194 (citing T. COOLEY, quoted at note 67 supra).
78. Id. at 197.
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that the right to dispose of property lawfully acquired, though unlawfully
held,79 was beyond the reach of legislative control.80
3. Emergency Cases: The Principle of Overruling Necessity
The state court opinions discussed above were predicated upon the
expansion and evolution of the principles underlying the sic utere max-
im. The development of a subset of police power enactments based on
the principle of overruling necessity paralleled this evolution. "Overrul-
ing necessity was the natural law predecessor of the noncompensable
police power regulatory concept and among the purest and oldest doctrin-
al examples of the general welfare concept-salus populi suprema
lex. "I' Definitional scrutiny applied through overruling necessity, repre-
sents paradigmatic utilization of the principle of conditions. In essence,
extreme social and economic conditions may generate a significant, if
temporary, expansion of the police power's scope. Injuries suffered by
property owners because of legislative action responsive to such
emergency conditions were, at common law, damnum absque injuria.82
In Russell v. Mayor of New- York,83 for example, the court held that
the destruction of a warehouse and its contents to create a firebreak in
New York City constituted noncompensable governmental action based
on overruling necessity. "[TI]he principle of preservation of life and
property in cases of eminent [sic] hazard, by the sacrifice of that which is
79. Id. at 198.
80. Id. at 197-98.
81. Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Cen-
tury America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854, 860-61 (1973) ("The welfare of the people is the
supreme law.").
82. The principle of overruling necessity originated in Lord Coke's opinion in
Mouse's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.C. 1600), in which an individual's property had
been sacrificed for the good of many-a hogshead of wine had been cast overboard in a
tempest to save the lives of drowning passengers. The owner of the wine sought but did
not receive compensation. This principle had continued applicability during colonial
times:
[I]t was well settled common law. . . that in cases of actual necessity,-as that
of preventing the spread of fire,-the ravages of a pestilence, or any other great
calamity, the private property of any individual may be lawfully taken, used or
destroyed for the relief, protection, or safety of the many, without subjecting the
actors to personal responsibility. In these cases, the rights of private property
must be made subservient to the public welfare.
F. DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 444 (P. Potter ed. 1871).
83. 2 Denio 461 (N.Y. 1845). Cf. Stone v. Mayor of New-York, 25 Wend. 157 (N.Y.
1840) (building destroyed to prevent spreading of a fire); Mayor of New-York v. Lord, 18
Wend. 126 (N.Y. 1837) (building destroyed to prevent spreading of a fire).
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
20 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
less valuable,'' 84 was not subject to the constitutional requirement of
compensation.
The Supreme Court eventually adopted the principle of overruling
necessity developed by the state courts during the early nineteenth cen-
tury. It provided the doctrinal basis for decisions upholding extreme
police power measures designed to ameliorate social and economic
exigencies,85 for example, legislation responsive to the upheaval of the
Depression of the 1930s.86
4. Wynehamer: The Origins of Substantive Due Process
One final state case arising during this period requires discussion.
Wynehamer v. People87 rivals Alger in significance. Its various opinions
promulgated the initial limited concepts of substantive due process. 88
Wynehamer was convicted for violation of a state liquor regulation. The
state court of appeals reversed the conviction by a seven to two vote,
holding that the regulation deprived Wynehamer of vested property rights
without due process.
Justice Comstock's lead opinion declined to "inquir[e] into the extent
of legislative power" 89 and instead dealt exclusively with "the construc-
tion, force and application"9 of due process protections of vested rights.
Comstock held the right to dispose of property legally acquired prior to
an enactment prohibiting such disposition to be among those "absolute
private rights" beyond the reach of the police power. 91 By focusing on
the enactment's impact on private rights, Comstock did not rely on
responsiveness analysis. 92
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice A.S. Johnson recognized
that the scope of permissible police power enactments necessarily
84. 2 Denio at 484 (opinion of Porter, J.).
85. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), discussed in text at notes 266-73
infra.
86. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933), discussed
in text at notes 299-316 infra.
87. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). See Trustees of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1
Mur.) 57 (1805); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); People v. Platt, 17
Johns. 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
88. See R. Morr, supra note 23, at 317-18; Corwin, supra note 6, at 467-68; Strong,
The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15
ARIz. L. REv. 419, 421 (1973).
89. 13 N.Y. at 383.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 387.
92. Id.
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evolves with changing conditions: "The determination as to what action
shall be forbidden, necessarily involves discretion, to be exercised in
view of all the circumstances which, at the time, are operating on the
welfare of the people. ' 93 Johnson held that the legislature was the
"ultimate judge" of these considerations and that judges were not to
assess "the widom of the laws under review, or of their reasonableness
or abstract justice." 94 Rather, the purposes that support legislative action
need only protect the public welfare. 95 Legislative discretion in determin-
ing the public welfare and the means chosen to protect it were accorded a
presumption of constitutionality. Nevertheless, Johnson viewed the chal-
lenged regulation as an impermissible prohibition that entirely destroyed
Wynehamer's property rights. 96
Summary
The police power underwent substantial growth and development in
the state courts during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century.
Although firmly established as the primary state regulatory power, it
remained linked to common law nuisance concepts and limited by re-
quired responsiveness to existing conditions. Thus, it was essentially a
negative power of self-protection used to prevent injury to the public
health and safety. Subsequent cases, most notably those decided by the
Supreme Court, hewed these common law bounds from the power's
definition.
II. 1876-1926: EXPANSION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF THE POLICE
POWER-ITS DOCTRINAL CONFLICT WITH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The first substantive expansion of the police power's scope occurred
from 1876 to the onset of the Depression. That expansion, which
commenced with the Supreme Court's recognition and adoption of the
principle of conditions in Munn v. Illinois,97 conceptually linked the
power to the broad social and economic changes engendered by post-
Civil War industrialization and urbanization. This linkage provided the
doctrinal rationale for the transformation of the police power from a
negative power of community self-protection into an affirmative power
capable of promoting the general welfare.
93. Id. at 411.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 421-22.
97. 94 U.S. 113 (1876), discussed in text at notes 100-14 infra.
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In counterpoise to this emerging affirmative police power stood the
vested rights principles of the contract clause, and, after some years of
reluctant development, the principles of substantive due process. Tenta-
tively advanced by the state courts prior to the ratification of the four-
teenth amendment, substantive due process emerged in 1904 as a full-
blown, if erratically applied, extrinsic limitation on the police power. In
large measure the post 1904 period was characterized by the doctrinal
conflict between a comprehensive, affirmative police power and the
economic and property rights protected by substantive due process. To
what extent could the regulatory authority of government control private
economic activity and thereby interfere with the vested rights and
economic expectations generated by the marketplace?
The principle of conditions manifested itself in several distinct lines of
cases decided during this period. It provided a significant tool for under-
mining notions of vested rights enforced through the contract clause, and
served to justify the power's intrinsic expansion under the due process
clause. After 1905, the principle's primary explication came in a line of
due process cases that tested the rationality or reasonableness of the
relationship between legislative purpose and the means chosen to effec-
tuate it. The principle was also applied in cases involving the taking
issue, emergency legislation, and the invalidation of enactments no
longer responsive to prevailing conditions. Moreover, its application as a
component of due process clause scrutiny was highly personalized and
analytically distorted in the substantive due process cases following
Lochner v. New York. 98
The presumption of constitutionality similarly influenced judicial
scrutiny during this period. Its application developed with greater specif-
icity and had increasing significance. In general, courts applied a pre-
sumption favoring constitutionality in cases utilizing definitional scrutiny
and the principle of conditions, whereas an inverse presumption was used
in Lochner-type substantive due process cases.
The expansion of the scope of the police power and the concomitant
doctrinal developments during this period occurred principally in Su-
preme Court decisions. Relying on its fourteenth amendment juris-
diction, the Court largely preempted state court resolution of police
power issues. As a consequence, few significant alterations in the pow-
er's definition occurred at the state level. 9
98. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), discussed in text at notes 169-75 infra.
99. Certain state cases of this period will be discussed where relevant in the notes.
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A. Munn v. Illinois: The Roots of Expansion
Munn v. Illinoisl°° stands at the threshold of the police power's
modern development. Reflecting the perceived need for the social
contract state to respond to fundamental changes in social conditions,
government authority was expanded to include forms of conduct and
levels of restriction previously left to the internal regulation of the
marketplace.
At issue in Munn was an Illinois statute fixing maximum rates for the
storage of grain in Chicago's grain elevators. 10 1 The regulated business
was entirely private and did not, therefore, fall within those categories of
businesses traditionally subject to rate regulation. 1°2 Nevertheless, the
Court, in a majority opinion by Chief Justice Waite, upheld the statute
and thereby incorporated rate regulation of private businesses "clothed
with a public interest," 10 3 into the scope of the police power. The
protection of individual economic rights had not yet been incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment: "For protection against abuses by legis-
latures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts. '"1° The
100. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). The federal and particularly the state court cases leading to
Munn are analyzed in Scheiber, supra note 10.
101. 94 U.S. at 123.
102. In dissent, Justice Field limited the subjects of rate regulation:
It is only where some right or privilege is conferred by the government or
municipality upon the owner which he can use in connection with his property, or
by means of which the use of his property is rendered more valuable to him, or he
thereby enjoys an advantage over others, that the compensation to be received
by him becomes a legitimate matter of regulation.
94 U.S. at 146 (Field, J., dissenting). See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 100. Schwartz
found five categories of business subject to rate regulation prior to Munn:
I. Those carried on under the authority of a public license or franchise;
2. Those which are not carried on as of right, but are permitted by government
as a mere privilege;
3. Those where the State renders special assistance, as by taxation, eminent
domain, or otherwise;
4. Those where use is allowed to be made of public property or a public
easement; and
5. Those which are vested with a legal monopoly.
See also Scheiber, supra note 10, at 385.
103. 94 U.S. at 126. Chief Justice Waite defined such businesses broadly: "Property
does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public
consequence, and affect the community at large." Id.
104. Id. at 134. Justice Harlan expressed similar sentiments regarding the remedy for
abuses of legislative power in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888), discussed
in text at notes 122-29 infra: "If all that can be said of this legislation is that it is unwise, or
unnecessarily oppressive to those manufacturing or selling wholesome oleomargarine, as
an article of food, their appeal must be to the legislature, or to the ballot-box, not to the
judiciary." See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), discussed in text at notes 156-
58 infra; R. Mort, supra note 23, at 329-42; Corwin, supra note 8, at 653-62.
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police power limitations found in Munn are definitional.
Waite's analysis began by placing the source of the police power in a
philosophical/doctrinal context composed of social contract theory,
common law maxim, and notions of sovereignty. When man entered the
social state he lost some of his natural rights and privileges in order to
prevent interdependent individuals from injuring one another; "[t]his is
the very essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.'' 10 5 This philosophical and doctrinal
analysis, blending the Court's earlier notions of residual sovereignty' °6
with natural and common law doctrines developed in the state courts,
gave the police power its definitional base and resolved all subsequent
issues regarding its source.1°7
Waite then examined the contours of its scope. He initially noted the
oligopolistic nature of the grain elevator business in Chicago.108 Under
105. 94 U.S. at 124-25.
106. Waite quoted his predecessor in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583
(1847), discussed in text at notes 23-27 supra, to substantiate his finding of equivalence
between the state police power and sovereignty. 94 U.S. at 124-25.
107. Waite found the source of the specific power to regulate rates charged by a private
industry in common law precepts enunciated in Lord Hale's treatise DE PORTIBUS MARIS,
reprinted in, A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45, 77-78 (F.
Hargrave ed. 1787), written two hundred years previously: "[W]hen private property is
'affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.'" 94 U.S. at 126. In
form, though hardly in substance, Waite's majority opinion in Munn represented the mere
application of these precepts. As pointed out by Justice Field in dissent, however, Lord
Hale's rule applied in the limited context of navigation laws and related principally, if not
exclusively, to the King's control of ferries and wharves. Id. at 149-51 (Field, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover, though DE PORTIBUS MARIS had been incorporated into the scope of
regulatory power, the only businesses previously held subject to rate regulation were
those which enjoyed special privileges granted by the state. See note 102 supra.
In pointing out the limited precedential utility of either an expansive explication of the
philosophical/doctrinal source of the power or the writings of Lord Hale, Field's dissent
also included a strong statement measuring the scope of the police power exclusively in
terms of the sic utere maxim:
The doctrine that each one must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor-sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-is the rule by which every member of society
must possess and enjoy his property; and all legislation essential to secure this
common and equal enjoyment is a legitimate exercise of State authority. Except
in cases where property may be destroyed to arrest a conflagration or the ravages
of pestilence, or be taken under the pressure of an immediate and overwhelming
necessity to prevent a public calamity, the power of the State over the property
of the citizen does not extend beyond such limits.
94 U.S. at 145 (Field, J., dissenting).
108. 94 U.S. at 130-31. The existence of monopoly status, unless created by govern-
mental grant of exclusive privilege, had not, prior to Munn, justified regulation of prices.
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 101. Moreover
[n]o other court [prior to Munn] has ever held that a legislature could fix the rate
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these circumstances, the power to regulate must exist whatever the state
of prior law:
Neither is it a matter of any moment that no precedent can be found for
a statute precisely like this. It is conceded that the business is one of
recent origin, that its growth has been rapid, and that it is already of
great importance. And it must also be conceded that it is a business in
which the whole public has a direct and positive interest. It presents,
therefore, a case for the application of a long-known and well-estab-
lished principle in social science, and this statute simply extends the
law so as to meet this new development of commercial progress. 109
Thus Waite explicitly incorporated the principle of conditions into his
analysis of the statute's constitutionality. '" 0 Changing social and
economic conditions, as a matter of constitutional definition, justified
significant growth in the states' regulatory authority and, therefore, its
capacity to intervene into the activities of private business.
Waite also allocated to the entrepreneur the risk that new legislation
might impair rights vested upon enactment: "A person has no property,
no vested interest, in any rule of the common law."III Such an interest
at which a private person performing a service, in which he has no other
monopoly than that which the possession of superior means for conducting his
business gives to him, and no aid from the public, should be compensated for the
service.
16 (New Series) AM. L. REG. 539, 545 (1877).
Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 409 (1894), which upheld price regulation of the grain
elevator business in North Dakota on the basis of Munn although approximately six
hundred elevators were owned by some 125 different persons, indicates that Munn was
more than merely the regulation of an oligopolistic industry. In Brass, the Court explicitly
ignored the principle of site-specific varying conditions:
When it is once admitted, as it is admitted here, that it is competent for the
legislative power to control the business of elevating and storing grain, whether
carried on by individuals or associations, in cities of one size and in some
circumstances, it follows that such power may be legally exerted over the same
business when carried on in smaller cities and in other circumstances.
Id. at 403. See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
109. 94 U.S. at 133.
110. With regard to the importance of responsiveness analysis in Waite's opinion,
Professor Corwin stated:
It is true that the Court does not at first sight seem to accept the enactment under
review as evidence conclusive of the public character of complainant's business,
but appears to canvass the subject anew on its own initiative. . . . A careful
examination of the language of the Court will show that this inquiry is entered
upon not with the design of insinuating that the Court might, if it chose, overrule
the legislative determination as to the public character of a particular pursuit, but
in order to ascertain whether the field which the legislature in this instance had
assumed to occupy was one which a legislature might ever enter legitimately.
Corwin, supra note 8, at 648.
i1I. 94 U.S. at 134.
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would limit legislative authority to respond to changes in conditions:
"[I]ndeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common
law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and
circumstances. 112
Finally, Chief Justice Waite relied on a presumption of constitutionali-
ty to substantiate the Court's holding:
For us the question is one of power, not of expediency. If no state of
circumstances could exist to justify such a statute, then we may
declare this one void, because in excess of the legislative power of the
State. But if it could, we must presume it did. Of the propriety of
legislative interference within the scope of the legislative power, the
legislature is the exclusive judge. 113
If any state of circumstances could justify the statute, its validity would
be presumed. Nevertheless, the Court noted that legislative understand-
ing of prevailing conditions was not conclusive. Moreover, the Court
failed to specify the manner in which the presumption was to be applied
to the ultimate issue of constitutionality. If the legislature was the
exclusive judge of "the propriety of legislative interference within the
scope of legislative power,"114 were the courts also to assess and deter-
mine the scope of that authority? This power/policy dichotomy was
explored in subsequent cases.
Munn's primary significance lies in its expansion of the police pow-
er's scope to include regulation of previously untrammeled economic
activity. To accomplish this the Court articulated new doctrinal and
analytical approaches to the question of constitutional validity. Funda-
mental among these was the principle that a police power enactment
derives justification from its reponsiveness to prevailing conditions.
B. From Munn to 1905: The Emergence of a Comprehensive Affirma-
tive Police Power and Substantive Due Process
From Munn until approximately 1905, the Court applied the principle
of conditions in two significant lines of cases: those involving vested
rights under the contract clause, and those using the principle to continue
expansion of the power's substantive scope. In addition, this period
witnessed the emergence of substantive due process.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 132-33.
114. Id.
[Vol. 1978:1
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1. Stone: The Contract Clause and the Inalienable Police Power
In Munn, Chief Justice Waite had denied a vested right in any "rule of
the common law." 115 Occasionally, however, the legislative enactment
conflicted with legislatively granted charter rights. Litigants in such
situations alleged the inviolability of charter provisions as vested contract
rights. The principle of conditions and the continuing necessity for the
legislature to respond to changing social and economic conditions pro-
vided a rationale for holding legislative authority inalienable by contract
and, therefore, superior to contract rights.
Stone v. Mississippi I6 was perhaps the most significant of these early
principle of conditions/inalienable police power cases. The state had
granted Stone a charter to conduct a lottery. By subsequent constitutional
provision, it had revoked the legislature's power to grant such charters.
The Court easily found that states had generalized power to regulate
lotteries; state constitutional authority was, therefore, not in issue.
Rather, the question was whether the legislature had immutably bound its
successors by granting the charter. Unlike its early contract clause deci-
sions-Dartmouth College and Charles River Bridge-the Court did not
distinguish between express and implied grants." 7 It held:
No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals.
The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. The
supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continu-
ing in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies
of the moment may require."18
The Court found this application of the principle of conditions supported
by Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in Dartmouth College, in which he
had excluded regulation of civil institutions from contract clause protec-
tion because it "ought to vary with varying circumstances.' 1 9 The
115. Id. at 134.
116. 101 U.S. 814 (1880). See Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 503 (1897).
117. See note 13 supra.
118. 101 U.S. at 819. The Court had previously held that the states' power of eminent
domain could not be bargained away. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507
(1848). See Contributors to the Pa. Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23 (1917). For
analysis of the states' taxing power and its apparent alienability by contract see United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in text at notes 390-410 infra.
119. 101 U.S. at 819-20 (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518, 628 (1819), discussed in text at notes 11-16 supra). The Court first
discussed the legislature's capacity to alter a prior contract between itself and a private
individual in dicta in Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645 (1876), stating:
We are not prepared to admit that it is competent for one legislature, by any
contract with an individual, to restrain the power of a subsequent legislature to
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individual charterholder bore the risk that a law might be changed.
Stone provided precedent for the continued application of the principle
of conditions/inalienable police power concept to contract clause and,
ultimately, due process clause cases.120 Moreover, its repudiation of a
vested contract clause right contributed to the emergence of substantive
due process as a means of protecting vested economic and property
rights. 1
21
legislate for the public welfare, and to that end to suppress any and all practices
tending to corrupt the public morals.
Id. at 650. See Hale, The Supreme Court And The Contract Clause: II, 57 HARV. L. REV.
621, 654-60 (1944); Hastings, supra note 1, at 477-78. See also Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde
Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877). In Fertilizing
Co. the Court stated:
The charter was a sufficient license until revoked; but we cannot regard it as a
contract guaranteeing, in the locality originally selected, exemption for fifty
years from the exercise of the police power of the State, however serious the
nuisance might become in the future, by reason of the growth of population
around it.
97 U.S. at 670.
120. See, e.g., Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-stock Landing Co. v. Cres-
cent City Live-stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., IIl U.S. 746 (1884), in which the
Court reexamined the legislature's power to repeal the grant of exclusive rights to
slaughter cattle in New Orleans and environs originally upheld in The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), discussed in text at notes 150-55 infra. The Court, per
Justice Miller, upheld the validity of the repeal:
It cannot be permitted that, when the Constitution of a State, the fundamental
law ofthe land, has imposed upon its legislature the duty of guarding, by suitable
laws, the health of its citizens, especially in crowded cities, and the protection of
their person and property by suppressing and preventing crime, that the power
which enables it to perform this duty can be sold, bargained away, under any
circumstances as it if were a mere privilege which the legislator could dispose of
at his pleasure.
111 U.S. at 751. See Corwin, supra note 8, at 656-67; Hale, supra note 119, at 660-61. See
also New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 460-61 (1905);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (analyzed in detail in Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH.
L. REV. 471 (1970)); cases cited note 239 infra. But see New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885), in which the Court enjoined the establishment of a
company chartered to compete with an older company operating under an exclusive grant.
The Court found that the obligations of the earlier grant would be impaired without the
injunction. Hastings sees this case as preserving the vested rights standards of Dartmouth
College at least with regard to grants to public utilities. Hastings, supra note 1, at 500-01;
Hale, supra note 119, at 661 n.265.
121. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,664-65 (1887), discussed in text at notes
159-65 infra: "In respect to contracts, the obligations of which are protected against
hostile state legislation, this court. . . said that the State could not, by any contract, limit
the exercise of her power to the prejudice of the public health and the public morals." 123
U.S. at 664-65 (Harlan, J.) (citing Stone and its progeny).
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2. Powell, Holden, and C.B. & Q.: The Power to Promote the General
Welfare
Use of the principle of conditions and its attendant presumptions to
justify the expansion of the police power's substantive scope manifested
themselves during this early period principally in Powell v. Pennsylva-
nia,122 Holden v. Hardy121 and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway
v. Drainage Commissioners (C.B. & Q.). 124 Powell applied conclusive
presumptions in a unique evidentiary setting. Holden extended the police
power into the field of labor legislation. C.B. & Q. confirmed the
transformation of the police power into an affirmative power to promote
the general welfare.
In Powell, a state health statute prohibited the manufacture or sale of
oleomargarine." s Powell's evidence, demonstrating the wholesomeness
of margarine, was excluded at trial; 126 Pennsylvania presented no evi-
dence substantiating the perceived health hazard. In upholding the statute
as a valid exercise of the police power, Justice Harlan's majority opinion
relied on a conclusive presumption that the legislature had conducted the
fullest investigation into prevailing conditions-i. e., the unwholesome-
ness of margarine. 127 Moreover, this presumption extended to the full
assessment of constitutionality: "[A]s it does not appear upon the face of
the statute, or from any facts of which the court must take judicial
122. 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
123. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
124. 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
125. 127 U.S. at 679. This same statute was later invalidated as an interference with
interstate commerce in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898). The majority,
judicially acknowledging the wholesomeness of oleomargarine, declared that regulation of
interstate importation to prevent fraud and misrepresentation would have been valid, but a
prohibition designed to protect the public health was no longer justified because condi-
tions had changed. Id. at 14-15. Indeed, it was the majority's judicial notice of the public's
reevaluation of oleomargarine that troubled the dissenters, Harlan and Gray: "That
decision [Powell] appears to us to establish that the courts cannot take judicial cogni-
zance, without proof, either that oleomargarine is wholesome, or that it is unwholesome
.... Id. at 27 (Gray, J., dissenting). As in Powell, the Court decided Schollenberger
without evidence.
126. 127 U.S. at 681-82. Evidence regarding the wholesomness of Powell's margarine
was irrelevant because it was presumed that most kinds of oleomargarine on the market
contained harmful ingredients. Id. at 684.
127. Id. at 686. Professor Corwin analogized the Court's posture regarding evidence of
prevailing conditions in Powell and Munn: "In Munn v. Illinois, the Court sets about to
canvass only facts of law, the only question for determination being the question of legal
power. In Powell v. Pennsylvania the same point of view is adhered to with emphasis."
Corwin, supra note 8, at 665.
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cognizance, that it infringes rights secured by the fundamental law, the
legislative determination of these questions is conclusive upon the
courts."' 28 Subsequent Court decisions did not follow this conclusive
presumption, either as to legislative facts or constitutionality, until 1940.
Even among Harlan's other police power decisions, his conclusive pre-
sumption in Powell is unique.129
In Holden, the Court used the principle of changing conditions to
substantively expand the police power. Utah had enacted a statutory
eight-hour day for men working in coal mines. Holden assailed the act as
violating the employers' and employees' due process rights to freely
contract. 130 Recognizing recent expansion of its scope of review under
the due process clause,' the Court nevertheless found the Act constitu-
tional. In so holding, it relied heavily on the enactment's responsiveness
to changing social and economic conditions: "[T]he law [will] be forced
to adapt itself to new conditions of society, and, particularly, to the new
relations between employers and employes [sic] as they arise." 132 In-
deed, the Court noted the general expansion in the scope of the power to
protect the health of employees:
128. 127 U.S. at 685. Justice Harlan continued:
It is not a part of their [the courts'] functions to conduct investigations of facts
entering into questions of public policy merely, and to sustain or frustrate the
legislative will, embodied in statutes, as they may happen to approve or disap-
prove its determination of such questions. The power which the legislature has to
promote the general welfare is very great, and the discretion which that depart-
ment of the government has, in the employment of means to that end, is very
large.
129. See, e.g., Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895), in which Justice Harlan stated:
But in determining whether the legislature, in a particular enactment, has passed
the limits of its constitutional authority, every reasonable presumption must be
indulged in favor of the validity of such enactment. . . . It is a well-settled rule
of constitutional exposition, that if a statute may or may not be, according to
circumstances, within the limits of legislative authority, the existence of the
circumstances necessary to support it must be presumed.
Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added). See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), discussed
in text at notes 159-65 infra. But see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1904) (Harlan,
J., dissenting), discussed in note 171 infra.
130. Liberty to contract is distinct from the contract clause right advanced in Munn
and Stone. In Holden, the Court denied the fourteenth amendment right to enter into
contracts prospectively which it had recently proihulgated in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578, 591 (1897), discussed in text at notes 166-68 infra.
131. 169 U.S. at 382.
132. Id. at 387. In support of this position, the Court relied on Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884), in which it stated: "This flexibility and capacity for growth and
adaption is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law . . . . [W]e should
expect that the new and various experience of our own situation and system will mold and
shape it into new and not less useful forms." Id. at 530.
[Vol. 1978:1
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While this power is inherent in all governments, it has doubtless been
greatly expanded in its application during the past century, owing to an
enormous increase in the number of occupations which are dangerous
or so far detrimental to the health of employees as to demand special
precautions for their well-being and protection, or the safety of adja-
cent property. 133
Adaptibility and flexibility were especially important in light of the
transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. 13 4 Holden thus
gave potential justification to a wide range of labor regulations respon-
sive to an increasingly industrialized society.
Although liberty to contract was recognized by the Court in Holden as
a form of property right, 135 it did not yet have a preferred status. Rather,
it was "subject to certain limitations which the State may lawfully
impose in the exercise of its police powers." 136 Principal among these
were the limitations on property ownership imposed by sic utere. 137
Thus, liberty to contract, like property rights in earlier state court deci-
sions, was subject to responsive police power regulation designed to
protect the community or its individual inhabitants.
In C.B. & Q., the Court applied the principle of conditions in the
context of the taking issue. A state enactment required the railroad to
reconstruct a bridge which blocked the channel of a creek. The railroad
objected, alleging that the enactment constituted an unlawful taking of its
property and a denial of its vested property rights. The Court, in affirm-
ing the statute's validity, held that the railroad's property was owned
''subject to the possibility that new circumstances and future public
necessities might, in the judgement of the State, reasonably require a
material change in the methods used in crossing the creek with cars." 138
It thereby relied on the principle of changing conditions in a localized
setting to hold that the railroad had no vested right in immutable legisla-
tion.
133. 169 U.S. at 391-92.
134. Id. at 392-93. The Court stated: "While this [police] power is necessarily inherent
in every form of government, it was, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, but
sparingly used in this country. As we were then almost purely an agricultural people, the
occasion for any special protection of a particular class did not exist."
135. Id. at 391 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,591 (1897), discussed in text
at notes 166-68 infra, for the proposition that contract rights are property rights). See
Hastings, supra note 1, at 543.
136. 169 U.S at 391.
137. Id. at 392 (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851)
(Shaw, C.J.), discussed in text at notes 57-63 supra, to hold liberty to contract a limited
right).
138. 200 U.S. at 586.
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Counsel for the railroad, however, also questioned the purpose under-
lying the legislative plan. Not a health measure within the traditional
scope of the police power, the plan's design, in counsel's opinion, was
merely to develop new lands for agriculture, a purpose not traditionally
supported by the power.139 Harlan's majority opinion did not refute this
argument. Rather, Harlan expanded the scope of the power to include the
promotion of the general welfare, along with the protection of the public
health, morals, and safety, among those purposes that could sanction a
police power enactment:" "We hold that the police power of a State
embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public
health, the public morals or the public safety." 14'
Two elements in this formulation of the power confirmed a significant
transformation in its scope. First, the purposes supporting its exercise
now incorporated a term, the general welfare, whose content was incap-
able of precise, comprehensive, and enduring definition. 142 Second, the
139. Id. at 592.
140. This re-characterization of the scope of the police power was not unprecedented.
In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865), the Court upheld a statute
authorizing the construction of a bridge over the Schuylkill River, defining the legisla-
ture's authority in terms of the "public convenience." Id. at 722. This language had
limited applicability to general police power cases, however, because courts generally
considered the state's authority to construct roads and turnpikes and its concomitant
power to regulate common carriers to be of a unique proprietary nature. See Railroad
Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 471 (1874).
The Court also defined the police power broadly to incorporate notions of general
welfare in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), discussed in text at notes 156-58
infra. Moreover, in Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905), decided in the same term as
C.B. & Q., the Court relied on a general welfare conceptualization of the police power to
confer wide discretion upon the legislature. Id. at 480-81. Manigault, a contract clause
case, reiterated the paramountcy of the police power "to any rights under contracts
between individuals." Id. at 480.
Shortly thereafter, the Court adopted an affirmative view of the power's scope.
Relying on C.B. & Q., the Court in Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907), held that the
police power "is not confined, as we have said, to the suppression of what is offensive,
disorderly or unsanitary. It extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the
State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people." Id. at 318. Although the
Court established the central elements of the principle of conditions test-responsive
legislation arising from and justified by prevailing conditions-it did not include a pre-
sumption of validity. See also Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 40-41 (1907); Western Turf
Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs,
203 U.S. 243, 253 (1906).
141. 200 U.S. at 592.
142. "Private property cannot be taken without compensation for public use under a
police regulation relating strictly to the public health, the public morals or the public
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police power was no longer constrained by the need to preserve or
protect, but could now "promote." This distinction was more than
semantic; it served to transform the police power from a negative power
of self-preservation necessarily constrained by common law notions of
cost spillover mitigation (sic utere) or nineteenth century concepts of the
community interest into an affirmative power no longer similarly
constrained. This transformation, though perhaps an inevitable response
to the increasing complexities of an industrializing, urbanizing society,
nevertheless signaled the elimination of significant common law
concepts from definitional scrutiny and the concomitant expansion of the
power's scope.
Harlan, recognizing that he had heightened the definitional ambiguity
of permissible police power purposes, immediately elaborated the stan-
dard of review to be used in assessing constitutionality: "[T]he validity
of a police regulation, whether established directly by the State or by
some public body acting under its sanction, must depend upon the
circumstances of each case and the character of the regulation, whether
arbitrary or reasonable and whether really designed to accomplish a.
legitimate public purpose."' 43 He thereby linked the principle of condi-
tions scrutiny applied in Munn and reiterated in Holden to the rational
relationship/means scrutiny'" he had developed in Mugler v. Kansas.45
Harlan failed, however, to explicitly weave the application of presump-
tions into this analytical framework. His use of the phrase "legitimate
public purpose" implies a moderate presumption favoring constitution-
ality. 146
C.B. & Q., decided in 1905, thus symbolizes a transition in the
evolution of the police power. No longer limited by common law defini-
tional constraints, its scope was more fully and completely identifiable
with that of residual sovereignty. Moreover, its linkage of the principle
of conditions and rational relationship/means scrutiny has provided a
safety, any more than under a police regulation having no relation to such matters, but
only to the general welfare." Id. at 592-93 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 592.
144. Harlan explicated the means/ends due process relationship as follows: "If the
means employed have no real, substantial relation to public objects which government
may legally accomplish; if they are arbitrary and unreasonable, beyond the necessities of
the case, the judiciary will disregard mere forms and interfere for the protection of rights
injuriously affected by such illegal action." Id. at 593.
145. 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), discussed in text at notes 159-65 infra.
146. Ample evidence of Harlan's use of presumptions exists, however. See notes 129
supra & 171 infra.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
34 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
standard of review frequently applied in due process and, since 1933,
contract clause cases.
3. Substantive Due Process: From Initial Reluctance to Lochner
In counterpoise to the emerging comprehensive police power, the
Court soon began to articulate the principles of substantive due process.
With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the Supreme
Court acquired jurisdiction over a new line of cases involving the intrins-
ic nature and scope of the police power. 147 Its first due process opinions
reflected a reluctance to impose constitutional constraints on the police
power through principles protective of individual rights. They also exhib-
ited a willingness to circumscribe the power through adoption of
common law definitional limitations. That is, although the Court refused
to apply concepts of substantive due process, it nevertheless began to use
the sic utere maxim.
The Court's initial reluctance to find substantive content in the due
process clause hesitantly succumbed to a variety of pressures and predi-
lections. 14 Components of substantive due process began to surface in
cases manifesting the Court's emerging desire to protect economic and
property rights. These principles, erratically applied, became a signifi-
cant extrinsic police power limitation in Lochner v. New York, 149 de-
cided in 1905.
In its first police power decision involving the due process clause, The
Slaughter House Cases,15 0 the Court upheld a Louisiana statute creating
147. "[W]hat the Fourteenth Amendment has done is to place upon the Court the duty
of weighing the individual interests comprehended under the very general terms of life,
liberty, and property as against the claims of society and of the state which are subsumed
under the equally general phrase, the 'police power.'" Brown, Due Process of Law,
Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 966 (1927), reprinted in 2
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94, 114 (P. Howard ed. 1938). See B.
ScHwARTz, supra note 17, at 39. In The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62
(1872), discussed in text at notes 150-55 infra, Justice Miller stated: "The power here
exercised by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential nature, one which has been, up
to the present period in the constitutional history of this country, always conceded to
belong to the States, however it may now be questioned in some of its details." (emphasis
in original) He reaffirmed this position in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 132-
33 (1873).
148. This transformation period is well documented. See, e.g., R. MoTr, supra note
23, at 337-42; Corwin, supra note 8, at 654-66; Cushman, The Social and Economic
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 MICH. L. REv. 737, 741-53 (1922),
reprinted in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60, 64-73 (P. Howard ed. 1938);
Strong, supra note 88, at 422-26.
149. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), discussed in text at notes 169-75 infra.
150. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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a monopoly in the New Orleans slaughterhouse business. Justice Miller's
majority opinion, which incorporated only the rights of recently eman-
cipated slaves into the scope of the clause, 151 limited the reach of the
power by juxtaposing the residual sovereignty definition previously used
by the Court 152 with the more highly circumscribed definition based on
the sic utere maxim as then applied by the state courts: 5 '
This power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable of any
very exact definition or limitation. Upon it depends the security of
social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an
existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private
and social life, and the beneficial use of property.
54
Justice Miller thus applied common law definitional limitations as a
matter of federal constitutional analysis of the police power.
155
The majority's limited view of the due process clause prevailed, with
exceptions, for two decades. Perhaps the most cited of these cases was
Barbier v. Connolly,156 in which no less a prophet 157 of substantive due
process than Justice Field stated:
But neither the [Fourteenth] Amendment-broad and comprehensive
as it is-nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and to legislate as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources, and to add to its wealth and prosperity.
58
By the very breadth of his conceptualization of the power, Field ensured
151. Id. at 81.
152. Id. at 63 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (Marshall,
CT), discussed in text at notes 18-20 supra, regarding the "immense mass" of state
regulation).
153. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62 (citing Commonwealth y. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53
(1851), discussed in text at notes 57-63 supra; Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27
Vt. 140 (1854), discussed in text at notes 66-69 supra; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES* 340 to
support the common law derivative definition of the police power).
154. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62.
155. Miller also would have related means to ends to determine constitutionality:
It cannot be denied that the statute under consideration is aptly framed to
remove from the more densely populated part of the city, the noxious slaughter-
houses. . . and to locate them where the convenience, health, and comfort of
the people require they should be located. And it must be conceded that the
means adopted by the act for this purpose are appropriate, are stringent, and
effectual.
Id. at 64. The chosen means were also monopolistic. See id. at 112 (Bradley, J., dissent-
ing). See also Corwin, supra note 8, at 657.
156. 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
157. See Corwin, supra note 8, at 653.
158. 113 U.S. at 31. See cases cited in R. Morr, supra note 23, at 335 n.19.
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that due process would not be used to interfere with the State's authority
to enact police power regulations.
Lochner, however, did not, like Aphrodite emerge full-grown.
Among the earlier cases in which components of substantive due process
surfaced were Mugler v. Kansas'5 9 and Allgeyer v. Louisiana.160 In
Mugler, Justice Harlan set out the rational relationship test that provided
the analytical framework adopted in a wide variety of due process cases
and to which he added the principle of conditions in the C.B. & Q.
case. 161 Harlan's rational relationship test presumed that police power
enactments were valid. 62 This presumption did not, however, preclude
the courts from looking "at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its
authority." 163 Courts were to scrutinize the rationality of the relationship
between the enactment and the public health, morals, or safety:
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or
substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.16
Harlan's test left two questions unanswered. First, was it legislative
purpose or means which must be rationally related to the public health,
safety, or morals? Or was it both means and purpose? Secondly, how
were the courts to define the content of the terms public health, safety, or
morals? Failure to answer this latter question was, perhaps, understand-
able in light of Harlan's reliance on the prevailing concept of police
power as limited to the prevention of harms. 165
159. 123 U.S 623 (1887). Mugler has been cited as the case in which the Court
"definitely established the due process of law clause as a restriction upon state legislation
of a substantive character affecting life, liberty, or property." Brown, supra note 147, at
947.
160. 165 U.S. 578 (1896). See Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315 (1872); In re Jacobs,
98 N.Y. 98 (1885), as formative state court substantive due process cases.
161. 200 U.S. 561 (1906), discussed in text at notes 138-46 supra.
162. 123 U.S. at 661. Harlan cites the Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878), to
support his use of the presumption. In that case, which involved an act of Congress, the
Court stated:
Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this
continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. One branch of the
government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The
safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on the strict observance of
this salutary rule.
Id. at 718.
163. 123 U.S at 661.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 669.
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In Allgeyer, Justice Peckham, the author eight years later of Lochner,
stated the specific economic and property rights to be protected and
preferred under the due process clause:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of
the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as
by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion
the purposes above mentioned. 166
The most significant fourteenth amendment right established in Allgeyer
was liberty to contract,167 a more inclusive freedom than the right to be
free from impairment to the obligation of contracts previously balanced
against the police power. Earlier contract clause cases dealt with the
authority to alter vested rights. Liberty to contract involved, inter alia,
the right to prospectively enter into contracts. Thus, liberty to contract
protected economic expectations as well as vested rights. 168
Lochner v. New York, 169 elevated liberty to contract to a preferred
constitutional status. Lochner involved a state statute which limited the
employment hours of bakers to ten per day. Finding the enactment
unconstitutional, Justice Peckham's majority opinion ostensibly balanced
166. 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,542-47
(1977) (White, J., dissenting); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399(1923); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 532 (1884).
167. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 12 n.67 (1973):
Had Chief Justice Marshall persuaded one more of his brethren to join him in
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827), the contract clause
would have applied without regard to whether a challenged law was enacted
before or after a contract had been made, and something like the Lochner era
would have begun in 1827.
168. Professor Strong characterizes the evolution to "a far more embracive conception
of the kinds of property rights protected by due process," occurring during the period in
which Allgeyer was decided, "as a transition. . . from use value-the 'tangible physical
thing'-to exchange value, 'the market value expected to be obtained.'" Strong, supra
note 88, at 422. Economic expectations are a prime determinant of market or exchange
value.
The general expansion in the definition of property and contract rights under the due
process clause is discussed in Brown, supra note 147, at 98-102; Corwin, supra note 6, at
468; Corwin, supra note 8, at 664; Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 461
(1909). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-43 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
169. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Number 1 ]
Washington University Open Scholarship
38 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the police power against the liberty to contract possessed by both em-
ployers and employees to determine the statute's constitutionality. 170 The
court did not, however, independently derive and then balance the power
against the rights allegedly infringed; rather, it focused on the extent of
infringement to a preferred liberty to contract.
By measuring the extent of infringement upon individual rights in this
manner, the majority skewed the rational relationship test promulgated in
Mugler. It required the state to demonstrate a heightened relationship
between the legislative purpose and the means chosen to effectuate it.
Moreover, that purpose had to be independently justifiable:
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote
degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment
valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end,
and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can
be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an
individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in
relation to his own labor. 72
170. Id. at 57. Justice Peckham stated: "It is a question of which of two powers or
rights shall prevail-the power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to
liberty of person and freedom of contract."
171. Justice Harlan, in dissent, took exception to the majority's skewing of the Mugler
analytical framework. At two points in his opinion he reiterates that Mugler called for
invalidation only when "there is . . . no real or substantial relation between the means
employed by the State and the end sought to be accomplished by its legislation." 198 U.S.
at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Rejecting the majority's inverse presumption of validity, Harlan advocated a pre-
sumption bifurcated as to purpose and means which he characterized in virtually conclu-
sive terms. After briefly describing the difference of opinion among experts on the health
hazards of baking, Harlan stated:
If sucli reasons exist that ought to be the end of this case, for the State is not
amenable to the judiciary, in respect of its legislative enactments, unless such
enactments are plainly, palpably, beyond all question, inconsistent with the
Constitution of the United States. We are not to presume that the State of New
York has acted in bad faith. Nor can we assume that its legislature acted without
due deliberation, or that it did not determine this question upon the fullest
attainable information, and for the common good. We cannot say that the State
has acted without reason nor ought we to proceed upon the theory that its action
is a mere sham.
Id. at 72-73. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888), discussed in text at notes
122-29 supra. Earlier in his dissent, however, Harlan split the application of this presump-
tion between ends and means and characterized it in less conclusive terms:
If the end which the legislature seeks to accomplish be one to which its power
extends, and if the means employed to that end, although not the wisest or best,
are yet not plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then the court cannot
interfere. In other words, when the validity of a statute is questioned, the burden
of proof, so to speak, is upon those who assert it to be unconstitutional.
198 U.S. at 68. See note 129 supra.
172. 198 U.S. at 57-58.
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Peckham thus inverted the presumption of constitutionality and placed a
heavy burden on the state to establish validity. The majority opinion also
reveals a primary concern with legislative policy rather than the existence
of legislative authority:
Statutes of the nature of that under review . . . are not saved from
condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the exercise of the
police power. . . unless there be some fair ground, reasonable in and
of itself, to say that there is material danger to the public health or to
the health of the employees, if the hours of labor are not curtailed. If
this be not clearly the case . ..the legislature of the State has no
power to limit their right as proposed in this statute. 173
In assessing the existence of conditions constituting a "material dan-
ger," Peckham dismissed the findings and views of experts and commis-
sions1 74 and relied instead on expansive judicial cognizance of "common
understanding" to determine that baking was not an unhealthful trade. 
175
173. Id. at 61.
174. Id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 59. In handling the judicially noticed information, Peckham drew the
following conclusions:
The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be
dismissed in a few words. There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the
liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor,
in the occupation of a baker ...
We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this
case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be
necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health or the
health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker.
Id. at 57-58. See Pound, supra note 168 at 470. Dean Pound stated that, "More than
anything else, ignorance of the actual situations of fact for which legislation was provided
and supposed lack of legal warrant for knowing them, have been responsible for the
judicial overthrowing of so much social legislation." See also Tribe, supra note 167, at 12.
Professor Tribe recognized the judicial "role of revising legislative findings about existing
social and economic conditions and about the dynamics of change that governed them" as
a principal problem with Lochner and its progeny.
Judicial cognizance of the "common understanding" that baking was not a health
hazard to bakers constituted the means by which the majority distinguished Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), discussed in text at notes 130-37 supra. In Holden, the Court
had expansively defined the police power's scope in the substantive area of labor regula-
tion. See text at notes 133-34 supra. Peckham stated for the Lochner majority: "There is
nothing in Holden v. Hardy which covers the case now before us." 198 U.S. at 55. The
Court limited Holden, therefore, to its facts. It did not authorize a broad legislative power
to regulate the relationships of employers and employees. Rather, it only narrowly ex-
panded the scope of the power to protect against direct, cognizable dangers to the health
of employees in extremely hazardous industries. Peckham, the author of Allgeyer, sup-
ported this highly restrictive view by quoting from the Supreme Court of Utah's opinion in
Holden which confined the power to regulate employees' work hours to " 'classes
Washington University Open Scholarship
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He did not defer to legislative fact-finding, but substituted judicial notice
of prevailing conditions.
Lochner was, therefore, doctrinally distinct from prior principle of
conditions and substantive due process cases. The majority applied a
balancing test derived from a manageable analytical method in an in-
verted and unmanageable manner. Because it focused on a preferred
right to contract, the Court failed to independently define the power
against which the alleged impairment of rights could be weighed.
Moreover, it ignored available evidence regarding prevailing conditions
and instead assumed those conditions that supported its holding.
C. From 1905 to the Depression: The Conflict Between Power and
Rights
Lochner, like C.B. & Q., symbolizes a transition in doctrinal evolu-
tion. Both stand at the threshold of the doctrinal struggle between the
police power and economic rights that characterized the period from
1904 to 1930. Several important subsets of cases emerged from this
conflict, including the principle of conditions/rational relationship cases
following the C.B. & Q. standard of review; inverse presumption /pre-
ferred rights cases following Lochner; contract clause cases reaffirming
the inalienability of the police power; vested rights/taking issue cases;
emergency cases; and, finally, cases in which courts examined the
continuing validity of police power enactments. One final case, Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,176 giving federal sanction to zoning as a
police power authority, combined many of the analytical components
developed in these cases.
1. The Principle of Conditions/Rational Relationship Cases
In C.B. & Q., Justice Harlan articulated an analytical framework for
determining the constitutionality of police power enactments under the
due process clause which used the principle of conditions to assess the
permissibility of legislative purpose and then analyzed the rationality of
the relationship between that purpose and the means chosen to effectuate
it. A series of cases in which a comprehensively defined police power
was arrayed against protected, but not preferred, economic and property
rights and the liberty to contract adopted Harlan's framework. These
subjected by their employment to the peculiar conditions and effects attending under-
ground mining and work in smelters.'" 198 U.S. at 55.
176. 272 U.S. 365 (1926), discussed in text at notes 285-95 infra.
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cases relied on the principle of conditions to assess responsiveness, often
deferring to local knowledge of local conditions. This presumption was,
at times, bifurcated along a power/policy axis, with judicial review more
rigorous in establishing the scope of the power than in determining
questions of policy.
In Lochner the Court invalidated a labor/health regulation governing
hours of employment. Subsequent cases involving employment regula-
tions, however, did not use the preferred liberty to contract or inverse
presumption analysis of Lochner. In Muller v. Oregon,77 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a maximum hours of employment
limitation enacted solely to protect women. In upholding the statute, the
Muller Court found that liberty to contract, inviolate in Lochner, was
"not absolute." 178 Moreover, although "it is the peculiar value of a
written constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon
legislative action . . . a widespread and long continued belief con-
cerning [a debatable question of underlying facts and conditions] is
worthy of consideration." 179 To that end, the Court may "take judicial
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge."' 80 Relying on exten-
sive documentation provided by Louis Brandeis, who filed a separate
brief,181 the Court recognized the unique physical status of women and
the public interest in protecting their health. 182
In another employment case, McLean v. Arkansas,8 3 the Court ar-
ticulated its analytical method:
177. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Bosley v.
McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Riley v. Mas-
sachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Sturges v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913).
178. 208 U.S. at 421.
179. Id. at 420-21.
180. Id. at 421.
181. Id. at 419. Brandeis' separate brief in Muller was the archetype "Brandeis brief."
Its impact was apparently determinative. Professor Cushman reported: "No intelligent
group of men could shut out from their minds the telling force of this presentation of facts.
The Supreme Court succumbed to it .... ." Cushman, supra note 148, at 754-55.
Brandeis, as a practicing attorney and a Supreme Court Justice, along with Justices
Frankfurter and Cardozo, strongly advocated the legal realism philosophy. See, e.g., B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); B. CARDOZO, SELECTED WRIT-
INGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO (M.E. Hall ed. 1947); Brandeis, The Living Law, 10
ILL. L. REV. 461 (1916); Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional
Law, 29 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1916). This school supported "the idea of presenting to the
court the actual evidence to prove that legislative regulation of social and economic
conditions was virtually necessary and for that reason constitutionally legitimate." Cush-
man, supra note 148, at 754. See also cases cited at notes 251 & 296 infra.
182. 208 U.S. at 421-23.
183. 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
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If there existed a condition of affairs concerning which the legislature
of the State, exercising its conceded right to enact laws for the protec-
tion of the health, safety or welfare of the people, might pass the law, it
must be sustained; if such action was arbitrary interference with the
right to contract or carry on business, and having no just relation to the
protection of the public within the scope of legislative power, the act
must fail.184
This protected liberty to contract was not, however, "unlimited in its
nature."" 5 Moreover, the court applied a presumption of constitutionali-
ty. Disagreement with legislative choice of public policy "afford[ed] no
ground for judicial interference unless the act in question is unmistakably
and palpably in excess of legislative power."' 86 Nor was it necessary for
the Court to question legislative judgment concerning prevailing condi-
tions: 187 "[T]he legislature being familiar with local conditions is,
primarily, the judge of the necessity of such enactments." 18 According-
ly, the Court held that the enactment, based upon a "very full investiga-
tion by the industrial commission," 189 was responsive to prevailing
conditions and thus rationally related to the public health and safety., 90
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. McQuire,191 Justice
Hughes' majority opinion drew a more precise line between permissible
184. rd. at 548.
185. Id. at 545.
186. Id. at 547.
187. Id. at 551. The Court did not question whether the state's presentation of substan-
tiated legislative facts accurately reflected prevailing conditions:
It is not for us to say whether these are actual conditions. It is sufficient to say
that it was a situation brought to the attention of the legislature, concerning
which it was entitled to judge and act for itself in the exercise of its lawful power
to pass remedial legislation.
188. Id. at 547. Deference to local knowledge of local conditions also manifested itself
in Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623
(1912); Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79 (1910); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909);
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907), discussed in note 140 supra; Otis v. Parker, 187
U.S. 606 (1903). See Brown, supra note 147, at 111.
189. 211 U.S. at 549.
190. Id. at 550. The Court held:
We are unable to say, in the light of the conditions shown in the public inquiry
referred to, and in the necessity for such laws, evinced in the enactments of the
legislatures of various States, that this law had no reasonable relation to the
protection of a large class of laborers in the receipt of their just dues and the
promotion of the harmonious relations of capital and labor engaged in a great
industry in the State.
191. 219 U.S. 549 (1911). The Court did not use the principle of conditions in McQuire.
Legislative power, both general and as articulated in and applied by the enactment, was
not in issue. "Here there is no question as to the validity of the regulation or as to the
power of the State to impose the liability which the statute prescribes." Id. at 571.
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and impermissible judicial scrutiny. Disagreement regarding policy con-
siderations was insufficient to invalidate an enactment. Nevertheless, the
Court was to determine the existence and scope of legislative power. 1
92
Moreover, the right to contract was not preferred above other property
rights. 193 Consequential damages to contract rights could also be damnum
absque injuria. If "the interference with the right to contract is incidental
to the main object of the regulation, and if the power exists to accomplish
the latter, the interference is justified as an aid to its exercise." 194 In
addition, the Lochner inverse presumption was not to be applied.195
The Court's reliance on the principle of conditions was more emphatic
in Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell."9 Justice McKenna, writing for a
unanimous Court, obliquely criticized the degree of judicial imagination
exercised in Lochner when he stated: "Legislation cannot be judged by
theoretical standards. It must be tested by the concrete conditions which
induced it .. ".. 197 Citing C.B. & Q., McKenna viewed the police
power as incorporating comprehensive, affirmative authority to regu-
late. 198 He accorded deference to local knowledge of local conditions, 19
9
and "allow[ed] [the legislature] a very comprehensive range of judg-
ment," subject to "constitutional limitations." 2" The Court, therefore,
could not hold "that the statute as a police regulation is arbitrary and
unreasonable and not designed to accomplish a legitimate public pur-
pose. "1201
Justice McKenna carefully examined the power's elasticity and re-
192. Id. at 569. The Court drew the power/policy dichotomy precisely:
The scope of judicial inquiry in deciding the question of power is not to be
confused with the scope of legislative considerations in dealing with the matter of
policy. Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result,
whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment of the legislature,
and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them within
the range of judicial cognizance.
Id. (emphasis in original).
193. Id. at 569-70.
194. Id. at 570.
195. Id. at 569.
196. 222 U.S. 225 (1911).
197. Id. at 233.
198. Id. at 232-33 (also citing Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907), discussed in note
140 supra).
199. 222 U.S. at 234.
200. Id. at 233.
201. Id. at 234.
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sponsiveness in Eubank v. Richmond:202 "It [the police power] is not
susceptible of circumstantial precision. . . .Governmental power must
be flexible and adaptive. Exigencies arise, or even conditions less pre-
emptory, which may call for or suggest legislation .... "203 Moreover,
the power's scope included legislation designed to promote the general
welfare. The Court nevertheless invalidated the statute because the
means were irrationally related to the legitimate state ends.2°4
In German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis,205 the Court revitalized
the principle that a private business clothed with a public interest is
subject to rate regulation. 6 Plaintiff challenged a state statute that
regulated fire insurance rates. Relying on the history of insurance indus-
try regulation2°7 and the principle of conditions, the Court upheld legisla-
tive authority to act. Munn provided the precedential support: 2°8 "It
would be a bold thing to say that the principle is fixed, inelastic, in the
precedents of the past and cannot be applied though modern economic
conditions may make necessary or beneficial its application.''209 The
Court regarded the determination of the general welfare's content as
primarily a legislative function calling for circumscribed judicial re-
view.210 The power/policy dichotomy articulated in McQuire, drawn in
terms of means and objects, determined the parameters of that review. 211
202. 226 U.S. 137 (1912). See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668
(1976); Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
203. 226 U.S. at 142-43.
204. i'd. at 143. Even applying a presumption of constitutionality, the enactment failed
because it precluded administrative discretion in site-specific cases.
205. 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
206. Subsequent to Munn, only transportation and public utility rates had been reg-
ulated. Id. at 406-07. That is, the "business clothed with a public interest" principle had
been used almost exclusively in its traditional common law context-franchised industries
frequently functioning as legalized monopolies. Moreover, because these industries en-
joyed special state privileges, they fell within the category of industries subject to rate
regulation prior to Munn. See note 102 supra.
207. 233 U.S. at 412. In Jackman v Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922), the Court
explicitly distinguished between historical justification and reliance on the principle of
conditions. Jackman involved the validity of a party wall statute:
[W]e might be driven to the economic and social considerations that we have
mentioned if the law were an innovation, now heard of for the first time. But if,
from what we may call time immemorial, it has been the understanding that the
burden exists, the land owner does not have the right to that part of his land
except as so qualified and the statute that embodies that understanding does not
need to invoke the police power.
208. 233 U.S. at 408.
209. Id. at 411.
210. Id. at 413-14.
211. "It would be very rudimentary to say that measures of government are deter-
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In New York Central Railroad v. White ,212 "modem conditions of
employment" supported legislation which abrogated common law rules
governing the employer-employee relationship in tort by establishing
state workmen's compensation.21 3 A unanimous Court held liberty to
contract subject to "a reasonable exercise of the police power. "214
Moreover, "No person has a vested interest in any rule of law
.... 215 Thus, the common law rules, though related "to the funda-
mental rights of liberty and property," were only "guides of conduct
. . . not beyond alteration by legislation in the public interest. . . . It
cannot be that the rule embodied in the [common law] maxim [respon-
deat superior] is unalterable by legislation.' '216
Reliance on underlying conditions also supported a maximum hours
of employment statute that governed both men and women and required
overtime pay. Unlike Muller, the Court in Bunting v. Oregon217 could
not distinguish Lochner on the basis of sex. Moreover, Justice McKen-
na's majority opinion made no mention of liberty to contract. Rather, it
applied a presumption of constitutionality to limit judicial review 218 and
relied on continuing responsiveness to prevailing conditions to justify the
enactment. 219 "New policies are usually tentative in their beginnings,
[and] advance in firmness as they advance in acceptance, . . . Time
may be necessary to fashion them to precedent customs and conditions
and as they justify themselves or otherwise they pass from militancy to
triumph or from question to repeal.''220
Thus, although Lochner obstructed economic regulation for almost
thirty years, particularly legislation protective of employees, it could be
circumvented. The Court did not uniformly regard liberty to contract a
preferred right. Under the C.B. & Q. review standard, it balanced
economic rights against a comprehensive, affirmative police power.
Furthermore, in juxtaposing definitional and means scrutiny, the Court
mined by circumstances, by the presence or imminence of conditions, and of the legisla-
tive judgment of the means or the policy of removing or preventing them." Id. at 415.
212. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
213. Id. at 197. See Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922); New York Cent.
R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919); Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400
(1919); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
214. 243 U.S. at 206.
215. Id. at 198.
216. Id. at 197-98.
217. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
218. Id. at 435, 437.
219. Id. at 436-37.
220. Id. at 438.
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applied the principle of conditions with a presumption of constitutionality
to legislative policy, means, and knowledge of prevailing local condi-
tions to overcome the preferred liberty to contract conferred by Lochner.
2. The Inverted Presumption Cases: Lochner's Progeny
Lochner's inverse presumption and judicial manipulation of prevailing
conditions analysis nevertheless affected a significant number of cases
decided prior to 1930.221 In some of these, such as Coppage v. Kan-
sas,222 the Court ignored the principle of conditions and focused exclu-
sively on the extent of impairment to individual fourteenth amendment
contract rights.223 In others, such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital2 4 and
Tyson & Brother v. Banton,225 the Court invoked an inverse presumption
requiring the state to demonstrate special or exceptional circumstances;
the police power was generally found too narrow to support the legisla-
tion in question. Liberty to contract retained the preferred status it had
acquired in Lochner. Finally, in a few cases, notably Jay Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan,226 the Court revised legislative findings of prevailing
conditions to justify its invalidation of the enactment.
Adkins and Tyson both concerned state rate regulations. In Adkins,
the majority invalidated a minimum wage regulation for women, stating:
"[F]reedom of contract is . . .the general rule and restraint the excep-
tion; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be justified
only by the existence of exceptional circumstances. '227 Similarly, in
Tyson the Court invalidated an ordinance that regulated the resale price
221. See B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942).
222. 236 U.S. I (1915).
223. Id. at 14.
224. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
225. 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
226. 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
227. 261 U.S. at 546 (emphasis added). See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 536 (1922), in which the Court stated:
The circumstances which clothe a particular kind of business with a public
interest, in the sense of Munn v. Illinois and the other cases, must be such as to
create a peculiarly close relation between the public and those engaged in it, and
raise implications of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reasonable in
dealing with the public.
An attempt in Wolff Packing to justify the regulation by invocation of emergency condi-
tions failed. Id. at 544.
In People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 15, 22 N.E. 670, 675 (1889), aff'd, 143 U.S. 517 (1892),
the New York court, upholding regulation of the rates charged by grain elevator
operators, stated: "We have no hesitation in declaring that unless there are special
conditions and circumstances which . . . justify legislative control and regulation in the
particular case, the statute . . . cannot be sustained."
[Vol. 1978:1
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of theater tickets because of the absence of special circumstances. 228 In
these and similar substantive due process cases, the Court continued to
elevate liberty to contract to virtual inviolability by applying the inverse
presumption standard. Only by proving the existence of exceptional
circumstances could the legislature justify the enactment in question.
Nevertheless, the Adkins Court did recognize that the police power
could adapt to changing conditions to promote the public welfare: "[T]he
line beyond which the power of interference may not be pressed is neither
definite nor unalterable but may be made to move, within limits not well
defined, with changing need and circumstance." 229 The public welfare to
be protected and promoted, however, included the individual's right to
be free from governmental restraint. 230 The Court thereby defined public
welfare not with regard to communal conditions but with regard to the
individual rights ordinarily subjected to restraint in furthering that wel-
fare. Social benefit was not balanced against individual deprivation; the
Court incorporated the prevention of individual deprivation into the
definition of social benefit.
Jay Burns Baking Co. involved a standard weight bread law designed
to protect the public against fraud. Schmidinger v. Chicago23' , had
previously established general legislative authority to regulate such mat-
ters. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the statute under a Lochner-
derived test. The majority relied on an unsubstantiated view of prevailing
conditions to hold the regulation an "intolerable burden upon bakers of
bread." 232 In dissent, Justice Brandeis admonished the majority for its
failure to inquire into the facts.3 3 Relying on broad judicial notice,
228. 273 U.S. at 429. See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Adams v. Tanner,
244 U.S. 590 (1917).
229. 261 U.S. at 561.
230. To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution,
is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it; for surely the good of
society as a whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against
arbitrary restraint of the liberties of the constituent members.
Id.
231. 226 U.S. 578 (1913). The Schmidinger Court had relied on the following presump-
tions of constitutionality:
This court has frequently affirmed that the local authorities entrusted with the
regulation of such matters and not the courts are primarily the judges of the
necessities of local situations calling for such legislation, and the courts may only
interfere with laws or ordinances passed in pursuance of the police power where
they are so arbitrary as to be palpably and unmistakenly in excess of any
reasonable exercise of the authority conferred.
Id. at 587-88.
232. 264 U.S. at 515.
233. "Unless we know the facts on which the legislators may have acted, we cannot
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Brandeis detailed and substantiated both prevailing conditions and prior
legislative experience with standard weight bread laws. He then applied
this knowledge to an analysis of the legislative purpose, the rationality of
the relationship between the chosen means and that purpose, and the
level of deprivation suffered by the regulated bakers. 234 A presumption of
validity resolved any conflict in favor of the legislation.235
Courts and commentators have frequently criticized these Lochner-
derivative substantive due process cases arguing that their elevation of
contract and property rights, inversion of the presumption of constitu-
tionality, and imaginative fact-finding "embodied a single immutable
doctrine that determined in advance and for all time which particular
substantive ends . . . the state could legitimately pursue, and which
• . . must remain beyond the state's reach.' '236 As such, they were
antithetical to reasoned, predictable application of constitutional limita-
tions on the police power including the principle that regulatory enact-
ments must be responsive to prevailing and ever-chainging social and
economic conditions.
3. The Contract Clause Cases: Vested Rights vs. Inalienable Power
A third subset of cases raising the doctrinal conflict between the police
power and protected economic rights concerns the principle of conditions
in its familiar and increasingly traditional role of justifying the inaliena-
bility of the police power. Derived from Stone v. Mississippi2 37 and its
nineteenth century progeny,238 these contract clause/due process cases
frequently involved interpretation of the charter rights of railroads with
respect to grade crossings. 239 In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v.
Goldsboro240 and Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Tranbarger,241 for
properly decide whether they were (or whether their measures are) unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious. Knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding should
precede judging." Id. at 520 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 520-33.
235. Id. at 533-34.
236. Tribe, supra note 167, at 12 and authorities cited at 13 n.70.
237. 101 U.S. 814 (1879), discussed in text at notes 116-21 supra.
238. See cases cited in note 119 supra.
239. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394, 411 (1920);
Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241, 244-45 (1919); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Minnesota ex rel. Duluth, 208 U.S. 583, 595-97 (1908); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
v. Nebraska ex rel. Omaha, 170 U.S. 57, 73-74 (1898); New York & New England R.R. v.
Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1894).
240. 232 U.S. 548 (1913).
241. 238 U.S. 67 (1915).
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example, Justice Pitney held "that this [police] power can neither be
abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant;
and that all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair
exercise."242 In Goldsboro, the Court defined the power in terms of its
responsiveness to prevailing conditions and sic utere expanded "to
secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the
community .. "243 Tranbarger also used sic utere to justify the
enactment, 2" but defined the power more broadly to include "regula-
tions designed to promote the public convenience or the general welfare
and prosperity, as well as those in the interest of the public health, morals
or safety. "245 Neither enactment constituted an unconstitutional taking of
property. 246 Thus, the police power stood superior to vested rights
when protected by the contract clause.
4. The Taking Issue Cases: More on Vested Rights
Additional attempts to protect vested economic rights involved the
taking issue. 47 Originally a component of constitutional scrutiny arising
under the fifth amendment's just compensation clause, the vested rights
protection implicit in taking issue analysis had been incorporated into the
due process clause in 1886 in The Railroad Commission Cases248
During the pre-Depression period, Hadacheck v. Sebastian2 49 and Penn-
242. 238 U.S. at 77; 232 U.S. at 558.
243. 232 U.S. at 558.
244. 238 U.S. at 77.
245. Id.
246. 238 U.S. at 77; 232 U.S. at 558-59.
247. The taking issue has been discussed frequently. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D.
CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63;
Michelman, Property, Utility & Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation'" Law, 80 HAtv. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property & Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971); Schreiber, supra note 10.
248. 116 U.S. 307 (1886). The Court stated: "This power to regulate is not a power to
destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation. . . . mhe State cannot...
do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation or without due process of law." Id. at 331. Professor Corwin, supra note 8,
at 658, identifies this finding of equivalence as an initial analytical step toward the
emasculation of Munn's "clothed with a public interest" concept and the emergence of
substantive due process.
249. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), and
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1961), discussed in note 363 infra,
presented the Court with analogous situations. In Reinman, the Court upheld an ordi-
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sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon2 50 were the principal taking issue cases. In
Hadacheck, the Court applied the principle of conditions to uphold an
enactment that significantly impaired vested property rights. In Pennsyl-
vania Coal, only Justice Brandeis in dissent recognized the potential
applicability of responsiveness analysis.251 Justice Holmes' majority
opinion held that significant diminution in the value of vested property
rights rendered the enactment unconstitutional.
Hadacheck involved a classic nuisance situation. A residential neigh-
borhood had expanded to surround Hadacheck's brickyard, originally
erected and used in a rural setting. So long as the land use operated in an
area bounded by countryside, it remained safe from the regulatory
constraints customary in more densely populated regions. Conditions had
changed, however, eliminating the variation. The Court allocated the risk
of such change to the property owner, and prohibited the brickyard as a
nuisance. The police power's capacity to respond to changing conditions
thus justified regulatory action previously held beyond the scope of
legislative authority. 2
nance that declared a livery stable in a populous part of town a nuisance. There was no
question of the legislative authority "to declare that in particular circumstances and in
particular localities a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law. .. ."
237 U.S. at 176. See Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 501 (1919) and
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 238 (1904). In Dobbins, the Court stated:
[Tihe right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business
lawful to-day [sic] may in the future, because of the changed situation, the
growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and
welfare, and be required to yield to the public good.
Id. at 238.
250. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
251. To Brandeis, the principal issue in Pennsylvania Coal was whether prevailing
conditions authorized the statute. "[U]ses, once harmless, may, owing to changed condi-
tions, seriously threaten the public welfare. Whenever they do, the legislature has power
to prohibit such uses without paying compensation. . . ." 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J.,
-dissenting). Having found the power, he would have upheld the statute. Moreover,
Brandeis recognized that an enactment responsive at its inception might become nonre-
sponsive over time. "Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious,-as it may
because of further change in local or social conditions,--the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore." Id.
Responsiveness over time was a prerequisite to continued constitutional validity. See also
note 181 supra and cases cited in note 296 infra.
252. It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential
powers of government, one that is the least limitable . . . . A vested interest
cannot be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. . . . To so
hold would preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive condi-
tions.
239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
[Vol. 1978:1
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Hadacheck concerned a land use traditionally considered noxious
under both nuisance law and early self-protective notions of the police
power. Analysis of the taking issue could therefore be structured along
doctrinal lines which distinguished eminent domain from the police
power by means of the harms/benefits dichotomy: "In the one case, a
nuisance only is abated; in the other, inoffending property is taken away
from an innocent owner."253 The reconceptualization of the police power
from a negative to an affirmative power rendered this mode of analysis
obsolete. Some new analytical method was necessary, therefore, to
distinguish takings from infringements damnum absque injuria.
Justice Holmes in Pennslyvania Coal introduced such a method; it
may be characterized as a continuum of appropriation/diminution in
value theory. 4 The police power and eminent domain exist on a
continuum bounded by compensable divestitures of title and noncom-
pensable regulation generating reciprocal benefits. 55 One measure of the
transition point from constitutionality to unconstitutionality is the di-
minution in economic value suffered by the owner. "When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.'' 256 Thus, the
definition of vested property rights in terms of exchange value became a
potential protection against excessive governmental infringement.
5. Emergency Cases: Paradigmatic Application of the Principle of
Conditions
Subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court relied on the common law principle of overruling necessity to
justify various regulations relating to emergency conditions.257 Although
253. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887), discussed in text at notes 159-65
supra.
254. See Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 372-74, 19 N.E. 390, 392-93 (1889), in which
Holmes, as a member of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, first developed this
continuum of appropriation theory. See also Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
255. Reciprocal benefits exist when the regulated party is compensated for his indi-
vidual loss by his share of the public benefit.
256. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
257. See R. MoT, supra note 23, at 345 n.43 & n.44 for a listing of these cases.
The Court had recognized the principle of overruling necessity as early as its decision
in Republica v. Sparhawk, I U.S. (I Dall.) 357, 362 (1788). See American Land Co. v.
Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911) (upheld emergency legislation designed to clear up land titles
after the destruction of public records during the San Francisco earthquake); Bowditch v.
Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (upheld Massachusetts statute denying compensation to
persons whose homes were destroyed to stop the spread of fire unless the home was
destroyed under an order of three or more fire department engineers).
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the precedential value of these cases was contextually limited, 258 they
represent paradigmatic application of the principle of conditions.
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,259 for example, the Court used overrul-
ing necessity 260 to uphold compulsory smallpox vaccinations. The state's
general power to protect the public health was acknowledged under
"settled principles.''261 The issue was whether the means chosen to
accomplish that end unconstitutionally infringed individual liberty se-
cured by the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that liberty "is only
freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment
of the same right by others, ' 262 i.e., constrained by the sic utere
concept. Moreover, "upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount
necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic
of disease which threatens the safety of its members.' '263 The police
The Court also decided during this period a subset of overruling necessity cases
dealing with procedural due process requirements for summary abatement. Generally,
emergency conditions justified summary action to prevent the injury, provided that the
property owner was ultimately afforded a hearing. See North American Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698
(1897); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1893).
At the state level, see In re Cheesebrough, 78 N.Y. 232 (1879), in which the court
recognized that extreme circumstances could justify the taking of private property with-
out compensation. "In such cases, the rights of private property must be made subser-
vient to the public welfare; and it is the imminent danger and the actual necessity which
furnish the justification." Id. at 237. Such taking, however, could not amount to perma-
nent appropriation. Property "may be temporarily interfered with or appropriated; neces-
sity may justify so much; but when the necessity passes away, the right ceases." Id. at
237-38. Although overruling necessity might justify extreme enactments, such justifica-
tion, and, therefore, the continued existence of power, were limited in time.
258. See, e.g., Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 437 (1927); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
259. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922), the Court upheld the
state's generalized power to require vaccination for all children attending public school
even though it found no evidence of an impending epidemic. The rule announced in
Jacobson, therefore, outgrew its emergency setting in much the same way the rule in
Munn had outgrown the need for monopoly conditions. See Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U.S.
391 (1894), discussed at note 108 supra.
This analogy does not, however, encompass all state court decisions on this question.
Some state courts had not required the existence of emergency conditions to justify
vaccination laws in cases decided prior to Jacobson. See cases cited in R. MoTr, supra
note 23, at 347 n.46.
260. The Court stated: "Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a
community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens
the safety of its members." 197 U.S. at 27. See R. Mor, supra note 23, at 345-46.
261. 197 U.S. at 25.
262. Id. at 27 (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890).
263. 197 U.S. at 27.
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power had sufficient flexibility to permit legislatures "under the pressure
of great dangers,''264 to enact a law that might otherwise be considered
an extreme infringement of personal rights. To hold emergency-based
vaccinations "arbitrary and not justified by the necessities of the case"
would usurp legislative authority.265
In Block v. Hirsh,26 the Court upheld a rent control law enacted to
alleviate emergency housing conditions in the District of Columbia
during and after World War I. A two-year time limit had been placed in
the act. Justice Holmes for a five-member majority applied a presump-
tion of validity to Congress' declaration of the underlying circum-
stances. 267 The issue then became whether those circumstances justified
governmental regulation.268 Ordinarily, rent control laws exceeded the
scope of public regulatory power. Nevertheless, "circumstances may so
change in time or differ in space as to clothe with [a public] interest what
at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely private
concern. "269 In the majority's view the housing shortage in Washington
constituted "a public exigency" subject to legislative control.270
Having established legislative authority to regulate, Holmes then ap-
plied the principle of conditions to resolve the taking issue. 27 1 The rent
control ordinance concededly diminished the landlord's power to profit
from his property.272 Although this diminution might have been sufficient
to invalidate the enactment in normal times, emergency conditions jus-
tified extreme exercise of the police power. Furthermore, the regulation
was only a temporary measure; "[a] limit in time, to tide over passing
trouble, may well justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent
change." 273 By placing an explicit and definite time limit in the statute,
the legislature had ensured its constitutionality. Three years later, in
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,274 Justice Holmes utilized that timing
264. Id. at 29.
265. Id. at 28.
266. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). See Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242
(1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
267. 256 U.S. at 154-55.
268. Id. at 155.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 156.
271. Id. Justice Holmes formulated the issue in terms of a continuum of appropriation:
"For just as there comes a point at which the police power ceases and leaves only that of
eminent domain, it may be conceded that regulations of the present sort pressed to a
certain height might amount to a taking without due process of law." Id.
272. Id. at 157.
273. Id.
274. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
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constraint. A Washington landlord contended that the housing emergen-
cy had ended and that the rent control statute was, therefore, no longer
constitutional. Justice Holmes not only remanded the case for a com-
plete development of the facts, he also agreed with plaintiff's under-
standing of the applicable principle of law: "A law depending upon the
existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may
cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though
valid when passed.'"275
Emergency cases presented the paradigmatic substantive application of
the principle of conditions. They explicitly predicated an exercise of the
police power upon the existence of social and economic conditions
necessitating governmental interference with individual rights. Further-
more, they required responsiveness to changing conditions to justify both
the law's enactment and its continuing validity.
6. Continuity of Conditions
Continuity of conditions formed the basis of two other police power/
principle of conditions cases decided during this period-Laurel Hill
Cemetery v. San Francisco276 and Abie State Bank v. Bryan 77 In
Laurel Hill Cemetery, plaintiff sought to enjoin the city and county of
San Francisco from enforcing an ordinance that prohibited burials in
existing cemeteries. The city had allegedly enacted the ordinance as a
health measure to protect growing residential neighborhoods from the
evils associated with burials.2 78 Plaintiff challenged this justification,
claiming that cemeteries no longer constituted health hazards; such
regulations, although originally responsive, had become invalid upon a
change of conditions.2 79 Justice Holmes relied heavily on a presumption
of constitutionality and on the "[t]raditions and habits of the communi-
ty"280 to uphold the ordinance. Evidence concerning changes in burial
methods failed to convince the Court that the legislature's findings of fact
were unsupportable. Holmes indicated, however, that plaintiff's
constitutional theory was correct: "The plaintiff must wait until there is a
change of practice or at least an established consensus of civilized
opinion before it can expect this court to overthrow the rules that the
275. Id. at 547-48.
276. 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
277. 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
278. 216 U.S. at 363.
279. Id. at 364-65.
280. Id. at 366.
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lawmakers and the court of his own State uphold."281 Upon conclusive
proof of changed conditions even a previously justified regulation might
no longer be a legitimate exercise of the state police power.
In Abie State Bank, a Nebraska statute established a depositors'
guaranty fund and mandated specified contributions by state banks.
Although the Court had previously upheld the statute in Noble State
Bank v. Haskell,282 plaintiff contended that twenty years of operation had
demonstrated its ineffectiveness. The Court, after analyzing data relating
to the statute's impact on banking practice,283 concluded that the enact-
ment was unresponsive to contemporary conditions and had become "by
reason of later events, arbitrary and confiscatory in operation. 284
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the law on the basis of a legislative
amendment that provided for the fund's liquidation.
7. Village of Euclid v. Ambler: The Themes Converge
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 285 was perhaps the Court's
most salient exposition of the principle of conditions during the pre-
Depression period. It continues to be of significant precedential value. In
Euclid, the Court confirmed state legislative power to regulate the use of
land through zoning. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, began his
analysis with a classic application of the principle of changing condi-
tions:
Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began in this country
about twenty-five years ago. Until recent years, urban life was
comparatively simple; but with the great increase and concentration of
population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing,
which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in
respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban
communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of
281. Id.
282. 219 U.S. 104 (1910).
283. 282 U.S. at 770.
284. Id. at 772. In defense of its enactment, the state argued that twenty years of
compliance with the statute estopped the banks from litigating its validity. The Court
refused to find such estoppel, stating: "The principle that a police regulation, valid when
adopted, may become invalid because in its operation it has proved to be confiscatory,
carries with it the recognition of the fact that earlier compliance with the regulation does
not forfeit the right of protest when the regulation becomes intolerable." Id. at 776.
285. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Subsequent zoning cases decided by the Court during this
period include Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 117 (1928);
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927);
Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
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which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are
now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive ...
And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitu-
tional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are
constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing
world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.218 6
Having established justification for the existence of power in the ad-
vanced conditions of urbanization, Sutherland established its parameters:
The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegiti-
mate assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It
varies with circumstances and conditions. A regulatory zoning ordi-
nance, which would be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might
be clearly invalid as applied to rural communities.2187
The principle could be applied on a community-wide basis, and to site-
specific situations, i.e., in taking issue cases. When an ordinance is
"applied to particular premises, . . . or to particular conditions, . . .
some of them, or even many of them, may be found to be clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable." 288 Courts considering such a challenge
were, however, to apply a middle level presumption of constitution-
ality. 28
9
Moreover, although no longer controlling as a component of defini-
tional scrutiny, the Court "consulted" the sic utere maxim "for the
helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of the
power.'"2I Whereas sic utere had controlled negative spillovers between
parcels of real property, zoning was designed to prospectively reconcile
competition between uses before negative spillovers arose. As such, it
was analogous in principle to the maxim.
The Court also placed the requirement of continuing responsiveness on
the power to zone. Ambler contended that Euclid was without authority
to divert natural regional development from its boundaries.29' Sutherland
dismissed this argument, noting the pre-eminence and independence of
286. 272 U.S. at 386-87.
287. Id. at 387.
288. Id. at 395.
289. Id. at 388. ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be
fairly debatable, the legislative power must be allowed to control.").
290. Id. at 387-88. Because of its ad hoc nature, nuisance law has been largely replaced
in the twentieth century by prospective legislative zoning.
291. Id. at 389.
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each municipality to govern its internal affairs.29 Nevertheless, future
changes in conditions might justify a reappraisal of that position. There
was always "the possibility of cases where the general public interest
would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the munici-
pality would not be allowed to stand in the way." 9
Having established regulatory power and applied definitional limita-
tions, Sutherland next analyzed the rationality of the relationship be-
tween legislative means and object. Unlike former nuisance ordinances,
zoning prospectively segregates land uses that are not customarily re-
garded as noxious. Nevertheless, Sutherland relied on state supreme
court cases to uphold the Euclid enactment as a permissible response to
changing conditions. z94 If doubt remained as to the efficacy of the means
chosen, Sutherland resolved them by invoking a presumption of valid-
ity.295
The Court in Euclid, therefore, applied the principle of conditions to
both justify and circumscribe a new exercise of the police power. Urbani-
292. Id.
293. Id. at 390. See also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), discussed in text at notes 417 & 426-32
infra.
294. Id. at 390-91. Of these state cases, Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477,
234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927), may represent the most exhaus-
tive explication of the principle. Miller concerned the extent of legislative authority to
zone. Plaintiffs conceded, in light of extensive precedent and historical practice, that the
police power could be used to segregate nuisances and "near-nuisances" from certain
districts, but questioned whether it extended to the segregation of "vocations, business
enterprises, and residential uses which are not intrinsically obnoxious." Id. at 487,234 P.
at 384. The Court held that such transformation in scope of the police power was
permissible: "[T]he police power, as evidenced in zoning ordinances, has a much wider
scope than the mere suppression of the offensive uses of property . . . it acts, not only
negatively, but constructively and affirmatively, for the promotion of the public welfare
... "' Id. at 487-88, 234 P. at 384 (citations omitted). The general scope of the power
was linked to the principle of changing conditions. "[A]s the commonwealth develops
politically, economically, and socially, the police power likewise develops, within reason,
to meet the changed and changing conditions." Id. at 484, 234 P. at 383. Thus, the Court
predicated transformation upon "the increasing complexity of our civilization and institu-
tions," id. at 485, 234 P. at 383, and particularly upon increases in population and the
attendant problems of urban congestion. Id. at 489, 234 P. at 385. Moreover, enactments
under the police power thus defined a presumption of constitutionality particularly with
regard to the legislatively chosen means. Id. at 490, 234 P. at 385-86. See Exparte White,
195 Cal. 516, 234 P. 396 (1925); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388
(1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 fI1. 84, 93, 149 N.E. 784,
788 (1925); Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1103-04, 184 N.W. 823, 826-
27 (1921); Wolfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 298-99, 150 N.E. 120, 123 (1925), all of
which explicitly linked the power to zone to its responsiveness to prevailing conditions.
295. 272 U.S. at 395.
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zation, increased population densities, and the variety of land uses within
the city heightened the likelihood of inter-parcel interdependencies and
negative spillovers. These changing conditions required an expansion of
the power's scope. Varying conditions and the requirement of continued
responsiveness limited the breadth of that expansion. In addition, Suther-
land applied these components of the principle of conditions through the
C.B. & Q. analytical framework: definitional scrutiny coupled with
rational relationship analysis of legislative means. The Court also refined
its use of the presumption of constitutional validity: presumptions would
be applied not only in taking issue cases but also when assessing the
validity of legislative policy as to means.
Summary
Beginning in 1876 with Munn v. Illinois and culminating in 1926 with
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court applied the principle of
conditions as a component in its review of numerous social and economic
regulations in a variety of analytical contexts. Its application generated
and supported a police power responsive to society's urbanization and
industrialization. These cases were overshadowed in social significance,
however, by the exception that became the rule-the preferred rights/in-
verted presumption substantive due process analysis introduced in Loch-
ner. The unresponsiveness to conditions mandated by Lochner when
confronted with the chaotic social and economic conditions of the De-
pression generated new constitutional standards of review that continue
today.
mII. 1933 TO DATE: DISPARATE VIEWS TOWARD ECONOMIC RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONTRACT AND DuE PROCESS CLAUSES: REEMERGENCE
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONDITIONS
An examination of the use of the principle of conditions in contempo-
rary Supreme Court analysis reveals a doctrinal evolution engendered by
the social and economic upheaval of the Depression. 2% The Court aban-
296. Application of the principle of conditions was not, however, limited solely to
assessing Depression-spawned enactments. In Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294
U.S. 405 (1935), for example, the Court, per Justice Brandeis, invalidated a Tennessee
statute that required the railroad to pay one half of the cost of constructing grade
separations. Regulation of grade crossings and the imposition of costs on railroads had
long been held to be within the scope of the police power. Id. at 413. The railroad
contended, however, that under the circumstances of the case, its property had been
unconstitutionally taken. Principal among those circumstances was the recent devel-
opment of a federal highway system in direct competition with the railroads. Id. at 416.
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doned substantive due process as an explicit standard of review while
incorporating the C.B. & Q. definitional scrutiny/rational relationship
test into contract clause scrutiny. The adoption of a "well-nigh con-
clusive" presumption of constitutionality when reviewing social and
economic legislation has largely precluded application of definitional
scrutiny under the due process clause. The contract clause, however, has
provided an infrequently utilized arena for application of definitional
scrutiny. It has also recently served as a vehicle conveying an inverted
presumption Lochner-type test.
In reviewing the statute, the state supreme court found itself precluded from as-
sessing whether changed economic and transportation conditions had rendered the enact-
ment invalid. Id. at 414-15. Brandeis disagreed: "A rule to the contrary is settled by the
decisions of this Court. A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another.
A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is
applied." Id. at 415. He then thoroughly documented the changes in the transportation
industry and held the enactment invalid. Brandeis thereby used the principle of conditions
to assess continuing validity, consistent with Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765
(1930), discussed in text at notes 282-84 supra; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543
(1923), discussed in text at notes 274-75 supra; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216
U.S. 358 (1909), discussed in text at notes 276-81 supra.
Brandeis frequently relied on the principle of conditions in his opinions. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), discussed
at note 251 supra; Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388,400-01 (1921) ("A rate
ordinance invalid when adopted may later become valid, just as an ordinance valid when
made may become invalid by change in conditions."); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
356 (192 1) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Whether a law enacted in the exercise of the police
power is justly subject to the charge of being unreasonable or arbitrary, can ordinarily be
determined only by a consideration of the contemporary conditions, social, industrial and
political, of the community to be affected thereby.").
Brandeis, a legal realist, would have found justification for regulations preventive of
ruinous competition in the emergency conditions of the Depression. In a dissenting
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), he described prevailing
conditions:
The people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency more
serious than war. Misery is widespread, in a time, not of scarcity, but of over-
abundance. The long-continued depression has brought unprecedented unem-
ployment, a catastrophic fall in commodity prices and a volume of economic
losses which threatens our financial institutions.
Id at 306. He then made his eloquent plea for legislative experimentation and judicial
restraint:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility
.... This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. . . .We have power
to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable
to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the
exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must
let our minds be bold.
Id. at 311. See note 321 infra; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 n.20 (1977).
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State court development largely paralleled that of the Supreme Court.
Substantive due process analysis has been widely, although not entirely,
abandoned in favor of a heavy presumption of constitutionality.
Nevertheless, state courts have continued to use the principle of condi-
tions in assessing the constitutionality of numerous police power enact-
ments.
A. Federal Developments
1. The Transitional Period: Emergency Conditions and the Demise of
Substantive Due Process
Among the economic dislocations contributing to and arising out of the
Depression was the rapid decline in market value of real estate, particu-
larly farm properties. This decline, coupled with the inability of lending
institutions to refinance the short-term balloon-type mortgages customar-
ily used to purchase such property, forced many mortgagors to default.
Banks and savings and loan associations foreclosed, acquired the proper-
ties at very low prices, and sought deficiency judgments against the
mortgagors to recover the difference. 297 In response to these conditions,
twenty-five states enacted mortgage moratoria legislation. 298
Minnesota's moritoria legislation was the first to reach the Supreme
Court. In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,299 the Court
upheld against due process and contract clause challenges a moratorium
statute authorizing judicial postponement of foreclosure sales and exten-
sion of the redemption period. Explicitly based on emergency conditions,
the statute was to remain in effect only while such conditions prevailed or
for a maximum period of two years. 3°° If conditions changed prior to
mandatory expiration, the act empowered the courts to modify their
individual orders granting postponements or extensions. 301
Chief Justice Hughes' majority opinion established a contract
clause/due process linkage that persists to date. 3°2 He regarded the
297. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 1932-1949, at 125 (1951).
298. Id. at 125 n.89.
299. 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
300. Id. at 416.
301. Id. at 418.
302. See B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 258-59 (1938);
Hale, supra note 119, Part III, at 890; Comment, The Constitutionality of the New York
Municipal Wage Freeze and Debt Moratorium: Resurrection of the Contract Clause, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 167, 179 (1976). See also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 46
U.S.L.W. 4887 (June 27, 1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1977), discussed in text at notes 390-410 infra.
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Court's task as "harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the
necessary residuum of state power, 3 03 i.e., applying a balancing analy-
sis. "The question," Hughes wrote, "is not whether the legislative
action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether
the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are
reasonable and appropriate to the end." 301 He used the C.B. & Q. test to
review a police power inherently inalienable either by contract or prior
legislation. Definitional scrutiny, applying the principle of conditions to
an emergency situation, established the legitimacy of the state's purpose.
Rational relationship scrutiny then gave sanction to the legislatively
chosen means. The Blaisdell decision relied fully on the principle of
conditions.
Hughes' definitional scrutiny first detailed the prevailing economic
emergency and then considered its relation to constitutional power.3"5
Was the moratorium responsive to prevailing emergency conditions?
"While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power. . . .The constitutional question
presented in the light of an emergency is whether the power possessed
embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular condi-
tions. "30 6 Hughes squarely predicated emergency legislative authority
303. 290 U.S. at 435.
304. Id. at 438.
305. Id. at 425.
306. Id. at 426 (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917)). Wilson involved
congressional power under the commerce clause to respond to emergency conditions.
Contemporary commentators disagreed over Hughes' use of emergency conditions to
alter the scope of permissible police power activities. Some felt that expansion of the
power in response to emergency conditions was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Zelkowich,
Mortgage Moratorium, 28 ILL. L. REV. 830, 835 (1934). Others, linking emergency power
to the principle of overruling necessity, thought precedent supported the majority in
Blaisdell. See, e.g., Clark, Emergencies and the Law, 49 POL. SCL Q. 268-83 (1934). See
generally Corwin, Moratorium Over Minnesota, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1934); Heffernan,
The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case, 9 IND. L.J. 337 (1934); Prosser, The Minne-
sota Mortgage Moratorium, 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1933); Note, The Minnesota
Moratorium Case, 3 BROOKLYN L. REV. 313 (1934); Note, Constitutionality of Mortgage
Relief Legislation, 47 HARv. L. REV. 660 (1934).
Whatever the status of the conditions relied upon in Blaisdell, subsequent decisions
have transformed the emergency circumstances of theDepressioninto everyday economic
conditions. For example, in Veix v. Smith Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940),
the Court held a New Jersey statute regarding the withdrawal of shares from savings and
loan associations, passed as a permanent rather than temporary enactment in 1932, to be
emergency legislation. Moreover, even if justified originally by the prevailing emergency
conditions, the Court found continued validity in light of the continuing economic difficul-
ties of savings and loan associations:
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upon the existence of exigent social and economic conditions. 0 7 Because
emergency conditions were temporary, however, they could justify ex-
pansion of the power's scope only for a limited time. When the emergen-
cy disappeared, so did the legislative authority.30 8
The emergency of the Depression may have caused the 1932 legislation, but the
weakness in the financial system brought to light by that emergency remains. If
the legislature could enact the legislation as to withdrawals to protect the associa-
tions in that emergency, we see no reason why the new status should not
continue.
Id. at 39. The emergency conditions had persisted and over time had become part of the
general economic setting. The law drew its continuing justification from that transforma-
tion. In light of that continuing justification, any alleged impairment of contract clause
rights was damnum absque injuria. Id. at 38.
Emergency status for prevailing conditions was also unnecessary to uphold defi-
ciency judgment legislation in Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1940). The act
in question limited a mortgagee's potential deficiency judgment to the difference, if any,
between the amount owed and either the fair market value of the security or its fore-
closure sale price, whichever was higher. Substantially identical legislation had been
upheld two years earlier in Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1938). The new legislation
was not, however, similarly "addressed to a declared public emergency." 313 U.S. at 230.
Justice Douglas, for the Court, nevertheless found it valid. The basis of the power to
regulate was a legislative extrapolation of equity's historical jurisdiction over uncon-
scionability in mortgage foreclosures. Id. at 231-32. Douglas found any rights potentially
upheld under the contract clause subject to the "reserved legislative power" to alter the
"formula . . . adopt[ed] for determining the amount of a deficiency judgment." Id, at
231. Quoting from Blaisdell, he attributed this power to alter contracts to "the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power . . . read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order." Id. (quoting 290 U.S. at 435). See United States-Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1, 22 n.19 (1977), discussed in text at notes 390-410 infra; East New York Say.
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945), discussed in text at notes 373-82 infra. But see cases
cited in note 308 infra.
307. Hughes did not limit application of the principle of conditions to emergency
conditions. He also linked the scope of the power to the normal progression and devel-
opment of an increasingly interdependent society:
The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of
a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities of
our people and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to
an increased use of the organization of society in order to protect the very bases
of individual opportunity.
290 U.S. at 442.
308. Id. at 439-40. Chief Justice Hughes stated:
But it does not follow that conditions may not arise in which a temporary
restraint of enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the
constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the reserved
power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community. . . . [I]f state
power exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts in the
presence of disasters due to physical causes such as fire, flood or earthquake,
that power cannot be said to be non-existent when the urgent public need
demanding such relief is produced by other and economic causes.
ld. Chief Justice Hughes used this requirement that emergency legislation be temporary in
nature and directly linked to prevailing conditions in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292
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In addition, a legislative declaration of the existence of emergency
conditions, although not conclusive, was "entitled to great respect.' ' 9
This deference did not apply, however, when the Court assessed the
continuing validity of previously upheld legislation:
[A] law "depending upon the existence of an emergency or other
certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency
ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed." It is
always open to judicial inquiry whether the exigency still exists upon
which the continued operation of the law depends. 310
Having established legislative authority to enact temporary mortgage
moratoria legislation, Hughes addressed the vested rights/contract clause
issue. He concluded, after analyzing prior opinions, that the clause's
prohibition against impairment of contract obligations "is not an absolute
one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula.' '311 Although laws in existence upon the execution of a contract
formed a part of that contract, the state retained amendatory power in
light of emergency conditions and the general public interest: "The
legislation cannot 'bargain away the public health or the public morals
. . .. ' The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its
continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference
with contract." ' 312 This principle of conditions/police power concept,
reflecting "the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power," 313
U.S. 426 (1934), to invalidate an Arkansas statute that placed the proceeds of insurance
contracts beyond the reach of existing creditors. The state attempted to justify the statute
by reference to emergency conditions. Id. at 432. Hughes found, however, that "the
legislation was not limited to the emergency and set up no conditions apposite to emergen-
cy relief." Id. He distinguished Blaisdell as involving temporary legislation "limited to
the exigency to which the legislation was addressed." Id. at 434. A statute containing "no
limitations as to time, amount, circumstances, or need" could not be upheld merely
because the legislature declared it necessary to meet emergency conditions. Id. See also
Triegle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 195 (1936).
309. 290 U.S. at 442.
310. Id. (quoting Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924)), discussed
in text at notes 274-75 supra).
311. 290 U.S. at 428. Society's ever-changing nature required flexibility in the interpre-
tation of constitutional provisions: "It is no answer to say that this public need was not
apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant
to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time." Id. at 442. This analysis
of historical progression is particularly significant since the Framers' purpose in incor-
porating the contract clause into the Constitution had apparently been to protect credit
obligations from impairment by debtor relief legislation. B. WRIGHT, supra note 302, at 4-
6. See 290 U.S. at 427.
312. 290 U.S. at 436-37, 439.
313. Id. at 435.
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applied not only to entirely private contracts, but also to legislative
enactments providing contract enforcement remedies and contracts in
which the state is an implicit party. Thus, since Stone v. Mississippi,314
the principle of conditions had functioned expansively to define the
power against alleged infringements to vested contract clause rights.
In analyzing the rationality of the relationship between means and
ends, Hughes emphasized that the statute was narrowly drafted to protect
the interests of creditors. 315 Although it altered the legislative remedy for
default, the statute left the creditor's interests and the debtor's obligations
largely unimpaired. 316 After balancing the minimal infringement suffered
against the communal interests served, the Court held that in light of the
emergency conditions the means chosen were not unrelated to the ends.
The Court also decided Nebbia v. New York317 in 1933. In Nebbia,
the Court considered the scope of legislative authority to regulate the
price of privately produced goods and services, an issue left unresolved
by Munn. Following Lochner, the Court had viewed price regulation as
that form of police power enactment which most seriously infringed
preferred due process contract rights. The state had, therefore, been
required to demonstrate "special circumstances" to justify the enact-
ment, i.e., the state had to overcome the inverse presumption. The
Court's validation of the price regulation in Nebbia significantly reex-
314. 101 U.S. 814 (1880), discussed in text at notes 116-21 supra.
315. See Comment, supra note 302, at 184-85.
316. 290 U.S. at 425, 429-34. The case law relating to the contract clause and the
availability of legislative enforcement remedies has had substantial longevity. See, e.g.,
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S.
(1 How.) 311 (1843); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Green v. Biddle,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
Opinions following Blaisdell found the legislature's authority to alter contract reme-
dies somewhat more circumscribed than therein indicated. In Richmond Mortgage & Loan
Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 300 U.S. 124 (1937), for example, the Court stated: "The
legislature may modify, limit or alter the remedy for enforcement of a contract without
impairing its obligation, but in so doing, it may not deny all remedy or so circumscribe the
existing remedy with conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the
right." Id. at 128. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977),
discussed in text at notes 390-400 infra; Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939). But see
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-07 n.9 (1965), discussed in text at notes 383-89
infra; East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945), discussed in text at notes
373-82 infra; Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1940), discussed in note 306
supra; Viex v. Smith Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940), discussed in note 306
supra. The Court did not use the obligations/remedies dichotomy in any of these cases.
317. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934).
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panded the power's scope and initiated the demise of substantive due
process analysis.
The issue in Nebbia was whether New York State could regulate milk
industry prices in non-emergency circumstances.31 1 Justice Roberts, au-
thor of the majority opinion, detailed both prevailing milk in-
dustry conditions 319 and the progression of past regulation. 320 He noted
that extensive legislative investigations had uncovered "destructive and
demoralizing competitive conditions and unfair trade practices. "321 Price
regulations had been imposed "to prevent ruthless competition."
322
Roberts, following Chief Justice Waite in Munn, relied on sic utere
principles to determine the power's scope: "Equally fundamental with
the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest." 3" Moreover, quoting from Justice Taney's opinion in The
Licence Cases, Justice Roberts linked the scope of the general welfare
with residual sovereignty324 to provide support for legislative authority to
318. See WOOD, supra note 297, at 108 for an analysis of the significance of the Court's
treatment of the conditions in Nebbia as arising from ordinary rather than emergency
conditions. See also Polikoff, Commodity Price Fixing and The Supreme Court, 88 U. PA.
L. REV. 934 (1940).
319. 291 U.S at 515-18.
320. Id. at 521-23.
321. Id. at 530. Ruinous competition had also been the economic condition advanced
to support legislation requiring a certificate of public convenience for the construction of a
plant to manufacture ice in Oklahoma. A majority of the Justices held that statute invalid
as excessively infringing "the common right to engage in a lawful private business." New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278 (1932). In dissent, however, Justice
Brandeis, joined by Justice Stone, found justification for the statute in prevailing econom-
ic conditions and linked the legislature's general authority to regulate to changing condi-
tions:
To grant any monopoly to any person as a favor is forbidden even if terminable.
But where, as here, there is reasonable ground for the legislative conclusion that
in order to secure a necessary service at reasonable rates, it may be necessary to
curtail the right to enter the calling, it is, in my opinion, consistent with the due
process clause to do so, whatever the nature of the business. The existence of
such power in the legislature seems indispensable in our ever-changing society.
Id. at 304 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis had also sought to eliminate the distinction between businesses
clothed with a public interest and all other private businesses:
The notion of a distinct category of business "affected with a public interest,"
employing property "devoted to a public use," rests upon historical error ....
In my opinion the true principle is that the State's power extends to every
regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for the public
protection. I find in the due process clause no other limitation upon the character
of the scope of regulation permissible.
Id. at 302-03. See note 296 supra. This distinction was eliminated by Justice Roberts in
Nebbia: "'[A]ffected with a public interest' is the equivalent of 'subject to the exercise of
the police power.'" 291 U.S. at 513.
322. 291 U.S. at 530.
323. Id. at 523.
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regulate prices. He then used the principle of conditions to equate price
regulation with other less onerous forms of police power enactment:
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest, and the function of the courts in the
application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in
each case whether circumstances indicate the challenged regulations as
a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as
arbitrary or discriminatory. 325
In place of the inverse presumption/special circumstances requirement,
the Court accorded the enactment "every possible presumption . . . in
favor of its validity . . .unless palpably in excess of legislative pow-
er. ' 326 It thus relied on a comprehensive, though not conclusive, pre-
sumption of constitutionality327 that left marginal determinations of the
power's scope to the judiciary.
The Court also incorporated the principle of varying conditions into its
taking issue review. Whether the application of regulatory authority to
specific conditions constituted an unlawful taking depended upon the
"given circumstances. ' 328 Hence, "a regulation valid for one sort of
business . . .may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business
under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation
depends upon the relevant facts. "329
325. 291 U.S. at 536. At a later point in his opinion, Justice Roberts stated:
If the law-making body within its sphere of government concludes that the
conditions or practices in an industry make unrestricted competition an inade-
quate safeguard of the consumer's interests, produce waste harmful to the
public, threaten ultimately to cut off the supply of a commodity needed by the
public, or portend the destruction of the industry itself, appropriate statutes
passed in an honest effort to correct the threatened consequences may not be set
aside because the regulation adopted fixes prices reasonably deemed by the
legislature to be fair to those engaged in the industry and to the consuming
public.
Id. at 538. Roberts thereby specified the nature of the conditions open to judicial scrutiny
and, therefore, necessary to justify price regulation of private industry.
326. Id. This presumption is analogous to the presumption generally used by the first
Justice Harlan. See notes 129 & 171 supra.
327. Application of this presumption along a power/policy dichotomy was unclear. It
was, perhaps, only applicable to legislative policy decisions:
[A] state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose . . . .With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or
practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent
and unauthorized to deal.
291 U.S. at 537.
328. Id. at 525.
329. Id.
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Nebbia, therefore, expanded the scope of the police power to include
regulation of the converse economic conditions to those present in
Munn. Its definition of the power, moreover, permitted price regulation
of a private industry without regard to its status as a business clothed with
a public interest. Moreover, it relied upon the principle of conditions in a
variety of substantive and analytical contexts.
Two cases reaching antithetical results on the issue of minimum wage
regulation for women-Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo3l and
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish331-followed Nebbia. In Morehead,
the Court relied on Adkins3 32 and invalidated the regulatory statute. In
Parrish, the Court overruled Adkins and hastened the demise of substan-
tive due process.
Notwithstanding its recent elimination of the special circumstances
requirement in Nebbia, the majority in Morehead held that liberty of
contract could be abridged only by laws enacted pursuant to exceptional
circumstances . 3 4 The Court found such circumstances absent in this case
even though the statute itself contained an extensive recitation of prevail-
ing economic conditions.335
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis
and Cardozo, filed separate dissenting opinions. Both opinions recited
the legislative findings of fact concerning the employment conditions of
women and children in New York.336 The Chief Justice then explicitly
linked the enactment's validity to prevailing conditions.337 The defini-
tional scrutiny thus utilized incorporated both the principle of conditions
and a general welfare component: "The test of validity is not artificial. It
is whether the limitation upon the freedom of contract is arbitrary and
capricious or one reasonably required in order appropriately to serve the
public interest in the light of the particular conditions to which the power
330. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
331. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See Brown, Minimum Wage Cases in the Supreme Court, 11
S. CAL. L. REV. 256 (1938); Hale, Minimum Wages and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. L.
REV. 629 (1936).
332. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), discussed in text at notes 224-30
supra.
333. The majority made no reference to Nebbia.
334. 298 U.S. at 610.
335. Id. at 626-27 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 625. The Chief Justice stated: "The validity of the New York act must be
considered in the light of the conditions to which the exercise of the protective power of
the State was addressed." Id.
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is addressed." ' 338 It eliminated, therefore, both the special conditions
requirement339 and the preferred right status previously accorded the
liberty to contract.' Justice Stone's dissent relied even more heavily on
the principle of conditions."n Citing Munn and its progeny, he linked the
state's power to regulate women's wages with the economic conditions-
the Depression-arising since Adkins. an 2
In Parrish, decided one year later, Justice Roberts joined the four-
member Morehead minority to uphold a virtually identical minimum
wage law. Unlike Morehead, in which the majority would not reconsider
the vitality of Adkins, 3 the Parrish Court squarely reexamined the
constitutional issues presented by state regulation of the employer-em-
ployee relationship." In his majority opinion, Hughes applied the stan-
338. Id. at 629.
339. Id. Although the Chief Justice's analytical method did not require a showing of
special conditions to justify an enactment, he believed "the special conditions calling for
the protection of women, and for the protection of society itself, [were] abundantly
shown." Id.
340. Id. at 630.
341. Id. at 632 (Stone, J., dissenting). He stated:
They include cases, which have been neither overruled nor discredited, in which
the sole basis of regulation was the fact that circumstances, beyond the control
of the parties, had so seriously impaired the regulative power of competition as
to place buyers or sellers at a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle such that a
legislature might reasonably have contemplated serious consequences to the
community as a whole and have sought to avoid them by regulation of the terms
of the contract.
Id.
342. Id. at 635. Justice Stone stated:
In the years which have intervened since the Adkins case. . . [we have had
opportunity to perceive more clearly that a wage insufficient to support the
worker does not visit its consequences upon him alone; that it may affect
profoundly the entire economic structure of society and, in any case, that it casts
on every taxpayer, and on governmerif itself, the burden of solving the problems
of poverty, subsistence, health and morals of large numbers in the community.
Because of their nature and extent these are public problems. A generation ago
they were for the individual to solve; today they are the burden of the nation.
Id.
343. According to the Parrish majority, the Morehead Court considered only the
question whether Adkins was distinguishable from the New York statute. 300 U.S. at 389.
Indeed, Justice Roberts noted in Morehead: "The validity of the principles upon which
[Adkins] rests is not challenged . . . .[Petitioner] is not entitled and does not ask to be
heard upon the question whether the Adkins case should be overruled." 298 U.S. at 604-
05.
344. 300 U.S. at 390. Chief Justice Hughes stated:
The importance of the question, in which many States having similar laws are
concerned, the close division by which the decision in the Adkins case was
reached, and the economic conditions which have supervened, and in the light of
which the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of the State
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dard of review proposed in his Morehead dissent and held: "Liberty
under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due
process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and
is adopted in the interests of the community is due process. '" 345 Thus, a
police power enactment, responsive to prevailing conditions and protec-
tive of the public welfare, met the substantive standards of the due
process clause. In implementing this test, Hughes again analyzed the
economic conditions attendant upon the employment of women, par-
ticuarly in light of the Depression. 346
As in his Morehead dissent, Hughes limited the nature and extent of
liberty to contract: "Liberty in each of its phases has its history and
connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the people." 347 Liberty to contract
was thus subject to society's right to protect and provide for the collective
welfare." 4 By limiting freedom to contract, Hughes eliminated the
state's need to prove special circumstances. In place of the inverse
presumption/special circumstance requirement, he applied the compre-
hensive Nebbia presumption of constitutionality. 349 By granting that
"the legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in police power
matters and, particularly, regulation relating to working conditions," 350
he provided the foundation for extensive judicial reliance on the pre-
sumption of constitutionality in resolving economic due process issues.
2. Olsen and its Progeny: Emergence of the "Well-Nigh Conclusive"
Presumption
In Olsen v. Nebraska,3  Justice Douglas completed the demise of
substantive due process initiated by Nebbia and Parrish in upholding a
Nebraska statute that regulated employment agency prices. The Supreme
Court reversed the state supreme court's decision to invalidate the act on
the basis of Ribnik v. McBride ,352 and explicitly repudiated the special
must be considered, make it not only appropriate, but we think imperative, that
in deciding the present case the subject should receive fresh consideration.
345. Id. at 391.
346. Id. at 399.
347. Id. at 391.
348. Id. at 392 (quoting Chicago, B. &.Q. R.R. v. McQuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911),
discussed in text at notes 191-95 supra.
349. 300 U.S. at 398.
350. Id. at 393. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
351. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
352. 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
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circumstances standard of constitutionality employed in Lochner and its
progeny. 353 In eliminating the inverted presumption, however, Justice
Douglas created a virtually conclusive presumption of constitutionality:
We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropri-
ateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest
a choice which "should be left where. . it was left by the Constitu-
tion-to the States and to Congress". .. There is no necessity for the
state to demonstrate before us that evils persist . ... 354
This presumption, more comprehensive and determinative than that used
in Nebbia and Parrish, effectively eliminated constitutional analysis
under the due process clause of alleged infringements to economic and
property rights. As a consequence, the Court abandoned responsiveness
analysis as a due process standard of review. The Olsen presumption
was analogous to that used fifty-three years earlier in Powell v. Pennsyl-
vania,355 decided at a time when protection of due process rights was left
"to the legislature, or to the ballot-box, not to the judiciary. "356
Olsen fostered a line of decisions in which the Court, principally
through Justices Douglas and Black, reaffirmed the demise of Loch-
ner:357 "I[I]t is [not] the province of courts to draw on their own views as
to the morality, legitimacy, and usefulness of a particular business in
order to decide whether a statute bears too heavily upon that business and
by so doing violates due process." 358 The Court, however, "has not
divested itself of the power to review and strike down legislation as
violative of due process." 359 Both procedural due process and Bill of
Rights freedoms, selectively incorporated through the due process
clause, have been applied to protect a variety of personal liberties. 360
353. 313 U.S. at 246-47.
354. Id.
355. 127 U.S. 678 (1888), discussed in text at notes 122-29 supra. The Powell presump-
tion was extreme even prior to the discovery of substantive content in the due process
clause. See text at note 129 supra.
356. 127 U.S. at 686.
357. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Laundry Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220
(1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Queenside
Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946). See generally WOOD, supra note 297, at 183;
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873, 880-81 (1976); Strong, supra note 88, at 449-55.
358. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
359. WOOD, supra note 297, at 183.
360. The Court has also substantially expanded the application of the equal protection
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With regard to economic rights, however, the Court "in effect has found
that a restriction embodied in a law which the legislative branch has
deemed necessary and appropriate to the welfare of the state is, for that
reason, due process of law." 361 It has thus continually reaffirmed the
creation of a substantial and virtually irrebuttable presumption of
constitutionality. As stated by Justice Black in Ferguson v. Skrupa:
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws ....
Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic
problems and this Court does not sit to "subject the State to an
intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Govern-
ment and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure." 62
Adoption of this presumption has not, however, eliminated the use of
definitional scrutiny. In Berman v. Parker,363 for example, the Court
clause since 1940. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). But see Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
361. WOOD, supra note 297, at 183.
362. 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)).
The presumption in Sproles was not nearly so extensive as that used in Ferguson. Chief
Justice Hughes had there written, as quoted by Justice Black in a footnote:
When the subject lies within the police power of the State, debatable questions as
to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature, which is entitled
to form its own judgment, and its action within its range of discretion cannot be
set aside because compliance is burdensome. 286 U.S. at 388-89.
372 U.S. at 730 n.7. When read with the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion in Morehead
and his majority opinion in Parrish, it may be said that the presumption in Sproles was
substantially more circumscribed than the presumption it supported in Ferguson. Hughes
did not abandon all due process scrutiny to a conclusive presumption. Rather, he struc-
tured it to reflect required responsiveness to prevailing conditions and the public interest,
leaving definition of the power's scope to the courts functioning within parameters set by
a favorable but not conclusive presumption. See Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251
(1932).
363. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974),
discussed in note 365 infra; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). In
Goldblatt, a case factually analogous to Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915),
discussed in text at notes 249-53 supra, the Court, per Justice Clark, upheld a zoning
ordinance regulating the dredging and excavation of gravel pits. "[I]ndulging in the usual
presumption of constitutionality," 369 U.S. at 594, it held that the ordinance was not an
unconstitutional taking as to Goldblatt. The ordinance was reasonable, defined in terms of
both definitional and means scrutiny: "To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore need
to know such things as the nature of the menace against which it will protect, the
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linked the power's scope to prevailing conditions to uphold an urban
redevelopment act passed by Congress for the District of Columbia.
Justice Douglas not only relied on the "well-nigh conclusive" presump-
tion he developed in Olsen,"4 but also expansively defined the public
welfare and scope of the police power to include aesthetic considera-
tions.3 65 Urban slum conditions justified this expansion:
[T]raditional application[s] of the police power to municipal affairs
.. .merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit
it. . . .Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more
than spread disease and crime and immorality. . . .The concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive.36
The Court's repudiation of substantive due process, however, has not
been final. In a number of recent decisions, the Burger Court has relied
on components of both substantiv6 due process367 and definitional
availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which
appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance." 369 U.S. at 595.
364. 348 U.S. at 32 ("when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive").
365. Id. at 33. Justice Douglas stated:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . .The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.
Id. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), Justice Douglas interpreted
Berman as having "refused to limit the concept of public welfare that may be enhanced by
zoning regulations." 416 U.S. at 5. His conceptualization of the scope of the police power
in Belle Terre, which involved an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance limiting
occupancy of single-family homes to families was, perhaps, even more expansive than his
conceptualization in Berman:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to family needs. This
goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker. . . .The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
416 U.S. at 9. In his opinions in Berman and Belle Terre, Justice Douglas removed any
federal definitional limitation on the scope of the police power as it relates to zoning. See
also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
366. 348 U.S. at 32-33. Justice Douglas concluded by assessing the means chosen to
effectuate the valid public purpose. Id. at 33-36. Here again, he relied heavily on the
presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 33.
367. These cases, however, have involved personal rights and not the economic and
property rights characteristically preferred and protected in earlier substantive due proc-
ess cases. For example, in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the
Court invalidated the Board's pregnancy leave regulations. Justice Stewart, writing for a
six member majority, used the means scrutiny component of substantive due process to
assess the legislation. Id. at 632-34. The use of definitional scrutiny was not necessary
[Vol. 1978:1
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because the state's purposes-protection of the teacher's health and classroom/teacher
continuity-were clearly within the scope of the power. Id. at 641 n.9.
Most recently, the Court relied on a rational relationship/means scrutiny analytical
structure to invalidate a zoning ordinance controlling the identity of those family members
who may permissibly occupy a single-family dwelling. Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977). Five separate opinions were filed in the five to four decision.
The ordinance in question was found to tread upon "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life. . . protected by the Due Process Clause," by Justices
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). Justice Stevens, in concurrence, believed that "a
fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of residential property" had
been infringed. Id. at 520. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, in dissent, would "not elevate
either the appellant's claim of associational freedom or her claim of privacy to a level
invoking constitutional protection." Id. at 535. Justice White, also in dissent, could not
believe the right in question "is one that calls for heightened protection under the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 549.
Concomitant with the various views expressed concerning the nature and importance
of the right infringed was the variety of standards of review considered applicable. Justice
Powell, for Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, rejected the standard for zoning
ordinances promulgated in Euclid and, instead, found that "when a city undertakes such
intrusive regulation of the family . . . the usual judicial deference to the legislature is
inappropriate." Id. at 499. The burden of persuasion was apparently placed on the
government: "But when the Government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, this court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation."
Id. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in text at
notes 390-410 infra, in which the Court also found the "importance of the governmental
interests advanced" to be in issue. The ordinance in Moore was invalidated because the
chosen means were not substantially and rationally related to the permissible legislative
purposes. "Although these are legitimate goals, the ordinance before us serves them
marginally, at best." 431 U.S. at 500.
Justice Brennan, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed with Powell's rational
relationship analytical format and the protected status of family-related rights. Id. at 507-
08. His opinion is noteworthy principally because he continued by developing sociological
data with regard to the prevailing status of the family. Id. at 509-10.
Justice Stevens also relied on a rational relationship test, although he believed the
limited Euclid standard of review appropriate: "Under that standard, East Cleveland's
unprecedented ordinance constitutes a taking of property without due process and without
just compensation." Id. at 521.
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, in dissent, would have relied on the equal protection
clause mere rationality test. Id. at 538. Quoting from Belle Terre, in which a similar
occupancy-related zoning ordinance had been upheld, they stated: "Every line drawn by a
legislature leaves some out that might well have been included. The exercise of discretion,
however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function." Id.
Justice White, in an instructive dissent, would apparently limit the content of
the due process clause to procedural due process and selective incorporation of substan-
tive Bill of Rights protections. Id. at 548-49. Recognizing "ample precedent for the
creation of new constitutional rights," he was nonetheless, "extremely reluctant to [have
the Court] breathe still further substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to
strike down legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its welfare." Id. at 544.
Nevertheless, "[a]ccepting the cases as they are [and] the Due Process Clause as
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scrutiny in analyzing the constitutionality of police power enactments.
Notably, in Roe v. Wade,3" the Court supported its invalidation of a
Texas statute prohibiting abortions by means of a changed conditions
analysis. Justice Blackmun, for the Court, detailed changes in medical
knowledge, the history of abortion regulation, and general attitudes to
demonstrate the contemporary invalidity of such statutes. 369 Of particular
interest was his use of medical data. When originally enacted, abortion
laws had been justified by the hazardous nature of the medical procedure.
construed by them," he recognized "several forms" of scrutiny "each differing in the
severity of review and the degree of protection offered to the individual." Id, The
protection of some preferred rights required the balancing of social benefit against indi-
vidual deprivation- with the balance skewed against the enactment's validity: "There are
various 'liberties' . . . which require that infringing legislation be given closer judicial
scrutiny, not only with respect to existence of a purpose and the means employed, but also
with respect to the importance of the purpose itself relative to the invaded interest." Id. at
548. Another form of scrutiny relying on rational relationship/means analysis would skew
the balance in favor of the legislation:
This means-end test appears to require that any statute restrictive of liberty have
an ascertainable purpose and represent a rational means to achieve that purpose,
whatever the nature of the liberty interest involved. This approach was part of
the substantive due process doctrine prevalent earlier in the century, and it made
serious inroads on the presumption of constitutionality supposedly accorded to
state and federal legislation. But with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934),
and other cases of the 1930's and 1940's such as West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
supra, the courts came to demand far less from and to accord far more deference
to legislative judgments. This was particularly true with respect to legislation
seeking to control or regulate the economic life of the State or Nation. Even so,
"while the legislative judgment on economic and business matters is 'well-nigh
conclusive. . . .it is not beyond judicial inquiry." Poe v. Ullman, supra, at 518
(Douglas, J., dissenting). No case that I know of. . .has announced that there is
some legislation with respect to which there no longer exists a means-ends test as
a matter of substantive due process law. This is not surprising, for otherwise a
protected liberty could be infringed by a law having no purpose or utility what-
soever. Of course, the current approach is to deal more gingerly with a state
statute and to insist that the challenger beat the burden of demonstrating its
constitutionality; and there is a broad category of cases in which substantive
review is indeed mild and very similar to the original thought of Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113,132 (1877), that "if a state of facts could exist that would justify such
legislation," it passes its initial test.
Id. at 547-48. Finding this test appropriate under the circumstances of the case and the
ordinance in question "not wholly lacking in purpose or utility," White would have upheld
it. Id. at 550.
It is difficult to discern from the various Moore opinions the future application of
substantive due process in personal rights cases. Moore may, however, signal its reemerg-
ence. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
368. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Cr. REV. 159.
369. 410 U.S. at 129-47.
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Blackmun noted, however, that "[m]odern medical techniques have
altered this situation. "370 The high mortality rates associated with early
abortions were now as low or lower than those for normal childbirth.
"Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an
inherently hazardous procedure . . . has largely disappeared." 37 The
Court held, therefore, that the state could no longer prohibit abortions
during the first trimester of pregnancy, but could continue to regulate
those aspects of the abortion procedure which traditionally fall within its
power to protect the public health.372
3. Contract Clause and Due Process Combined: Contemporary Use of
the Principle of Conditions
Although the conclusive presumption has, until recently, largely pre-
cluded the use of definitional scrutiny in due process and economic rights
cases, its vitality in contract clause cases has continued. These cases,
although few in number since the Depression, have reaffirmed the semin-
al value of Blaisdell and its use of the C.B. & Q. analytical framework
and the principle of conditions. Moreover, in contrast to the personal
interests protected in Roe v. Wade, these cases have applied a standard
of constitutional review originally developed under the due process
clause to protect economic and property rights.
The first contract clause case decided after Olsen and its promulga-
tion of the conclusive presumption was East New York Savings Bank v.
Hahn. 37 3 In East New York, the Court considered a contract clause
challenge to the continuing validity of an extension and amendment of
New York's twelve year old mortgage moratorium law. 374 Justice Frank-
furter relied on Blaisdell and Manigault v. Springs375 to establish the
power's general supremacy over the obligations of entirely private
contracts.376 The bank contended, however, that changed economic
conditions had removed the constitutional basis on which the original act
had been predicated, citing Justice Holmes' opinion in Chastleton Corp.
v. Sinclair.377 Frankfurter noted that New York had annually reenacted
370. Id. at 149.
371. Id.
372. Id. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1972).
373. 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
374. Id. at 231. The Court found the bank's due process arguments "too feeble to merit
consideration.- Id.
375. 199 U.S. 473 (1905), discussed in note 140 supra.
376. 326 U.S. at 231-33.
377. 264 U.S. 543 (1924), discussed in text at notes 274-75 supra.
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and frequently amended its statute to reflect "changed economic condi-
tions," as comprehensively assessed by joint legislative committee, and
was thus distinguishable from Chastleton :378 "The whole course of the
New York moratorium legislation shows the empiric process of legisla-
tion at its fairest: frequent reconsideration, intensive study of the conse-
quences of what has been done, readjustment to changing conditions, and
safeguarding the future on the basis of reasonable forecasts. ,379 Not only
the legislature's method but also the extent of its analysis of prevailing
economic conditions demonstrated that the appropriate locus of decision-
making was the legislature and not the courts.380
Although the emergency conditions that originally justified the
moratorium legislation had ended, the Court noted that comparably
compelling conditions presently existed because "[s]udden termination
. . .might well result in an emergency more acute than that which the
original legislation was intended to alleviate. "31 Frankfurter, therefore,
incorporated the continued existence of the moratorium into the expecta-
tions of the business community. The potential adverse impact of de-
stroying those expectations in light of the recent conclusion of World
War II justified the Act's extension.382
The Court also relied on Blaisdell in City of El Paso v. Simmons 383 to
uphold an amendment to Texas' Land Sales Act which reduced a previ-
ously unlimited reinstatement period to five years from the date of
forfeiture. Cited as "a comprehensive restatement of the principles
underlying the application of the Contract Clause,'"'3 Blaisdell estab-
lished that the state possessed sovereign authority to protect its "econom-
ic interests" and "to safeguard the vital interests of its people," and to
"exercise . . . its continuing and dominant protective power notwith-
standing interference with contracts." ' 385 Such an exercise of the police
power, moreover, was presumptively valid. 386 Nevertheless, as Blaisdell
itself indicated: "The reserved power cannot be construed so as to
destroy the [contract clause] limitation, nor is the limitation to be
378. 326 U.S. at 233-34.
379. Id. at 234-35.
380. Id. Consonant with this position, the Court applied a presumption of constitution-
ality. Id. at 233.
381. Id. at 235.
382. Id. at 234-35.
383. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
384. Id. at 508.
385. Id. (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1933),
discussed in text at notes 299-316 supra).
386. 379 U.S. at 508-09 (citing East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33
(1945), discussed in text at notes 373-82 supra).
[Vol. 1978:1
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construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They
must be construed in harmony with each other." 387 The Court, therefore,
balanced social benefits arising from the legislation against individual
contract impairment to determine its constitutionality:
The program adopted at the turn of the century. . . was not wholly
effectual to serve the objectives of the State's land program many
decades later. . . . Given these objectives and the impediments
posed to their fulfillment by timeless reinstatement rights, a statute of
repose was quite clearly necessary. The measure taken to induce
defaulting purchasers to comply with their contracts . . . was a mild
one indeed, hardly burdensome to the purchaser who wanted to adhere
to his contract of purchase, but nonetheless an important one to the
State's interest. The Contract Clause does not forbid such a meas-
ure.
3 8
The state now had a "vital interest" in generating revenues for schools
and providing space for its growing population.389 These objectives,
responsive to changing conditions, outweighed the speculative interests
of purchasers.
In 1976, the Court discussed the "harmony" between the contract
clause and the police power in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey.
3 9°
United States Trust concerned the protection of vested rights arising
from a contract between the state and private citizens. The challenged
enactment repealed a covenant between New York and New
Jersey that had limited the Port Authority's ability to subsidize commuter
rail transportation out of revenues and reserves pledged as security for its
consolidated bonds. The Court invalidated the repeal by a four to three
vote. 39
1
387. 379 U.S. at 509.
388. Id. at 516-17.
389. Id. at 515.
390. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). United States Trust tends to confirm "suggestions that the
Burger Court is more sympathetic to business than was the Warren Court." Howard,
supra note 357, at 881. Professor Howard documents this transition, but concludes:
"[W]hatever the philosophical assumptions underlying these decisions, they do not seem
to have undercut the Court's refusal to revive the old uses of substantive due process in
economic cases." Id. But see City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 379
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring), cited in Howard, supra note 357, at 881 n.40. To the extent
that the majority's opinion in United States Trust represents the application of Lochner-
derivative substantive due process to economic rights under the contract clause it extends
the Burger Court's sympathies into uncharted regions. In Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus. 46 U.S.L.W. 4887 (June 27, 1978), the Court reaffirmed the vitality of the
contract clause as a means of protecting economic and property rights: "If the Contract
Clause is to retain any meaning at all, however, it must be understood to impose some
limits upon the power of a state to abridge existing contractual relationships even in the
exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4889.
391. Justices Stewart and Powell did not take part in the Court's decision.
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Justice Blackmun's majority opinion confirmed and extended the link-
age between the contract and the due process clauses. Indeed, the test
applied is similar to that used in Lochner substantive due process cases
and thus departs significantly from Blaisdell and its progeny.
Although Justice Blackmun recognized that the police power is ina-
lienable by contract, he held this status non-determinative in "an inquiry
into the purpose or reasonableness of the subsequent impairment.' '392
Moreover, because the repealed covenant had altered a financial obliga-
tion of the state, it was predicated not only on the police power but also
on the taxing and spending power. This latter power could be "contract-
ed away. " 3 93 Blackmun then structured the applicable contract clause
test:
As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impair-
ment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose. In applying this standard, however,
complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and
necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at
stake.394
The most critical component of this vested rights/substantive due
process test was its inverse presumption of constitutionality. The majori-
ty applied two forms of presumption. First, when the state is a party to
the contract, it has the burden of proving the impairment's constitutional-
ity. Because the "State's self-interest is at stake" whenever it contracts
with private persons under its sovereign powers, this inverse presumption
may apply to more than financial obligations. Of greater significance,
however, is the inverse presumption implicit in the phrase "important
public purpose," recognized and made explicit by Chief Justice Burger's
concurring opinion. 395 This presumption is analogous to the inverted
"special circumstances" presumption of Lochner and its progeny. 396 If
applied generally, it could provide a means of protecting and conferring
preferred status on vested economic rights.
Reasonableness, the first component of Justice Blackmun's test, is a
function of responsiveness to changed circumstances-with a twist.
392. 431 U.S. at 23.
393. Id. at 24. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan found that "[a]s either an
analytical or practical matter, this distinction is illusory." Id. at 51.
394. Id. at 25-26.
395. Id. at 32-33.
396. It is also analogous in kind, and potentially in degree, to the inverted "compelling
state interest" presumption found in substantive equal protection cases.
[Vol. 1978:1
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Despite the undoubted growth in the "public perception of the impor-
tance of mass transit . ..because of increased general concern with
environmental protection and energy conservation . . .these concerns
were not unknown in 1962, and the subsequent changes were of degree
and not of kind." 3 97 The impact of the covenant when repealed was
substantially identical to its impact when adopted.398 Justice Brennan's
dissent, found the "surprise" or "unforeseeability" component of this
test contrary to customary judicial deference and without historical foun-
dation. 399 The data as herein developed strongly confirms Justice Bren-
nan's view. Prior to United States Trust, the Court had not imposed an
inverted presumption in contract clause scrutiny.
Necessity, the second component of Blackmun's standard of review, is
a means test that focuses on the degree and depth of infringement. An
enactment is necessary when "essential," that is, when no "less dras-
tic" alternative is available, and no "alternative means of achieving" the
state's purpose can be adopted. 4°° The majority explicitly placed the
burden of proving necessity on the state.4°1 The majority also declined to
balance social benefit against individual deprivation,' despite its re-
liance on Blaisdell and El Paso: "We do not accept this invitation [by
appellees] to engage in utilitarian comparison of public benefit and
private loss."4 3
Justice Brennan, in dissent, criticized the Court's unwillingness to
balance, 404 referring to trial evidence indicating that appellants' loss from
397. 431 U.S. at 32.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 54-55 nn.17 & 59. Justice Brennan viewed the majority's inversion of the
presumption as applicable only to public contractual obligations. He stated:
The Court makes clear that it contemplates stricter judicial review under the
Contract Clause when the Government's own obligations are in issue, but points
to no case in support of this multi-headed view of the scope of the Clause .....
[Tihis position finds no support in the historical rationale for inclusion of the
Contract Clause in the Constitution.
Id. at 53 n.16.
400. Id. at 29-30.
401. Id. at 31.
402. Id. at 29.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 34. Justice Brennan stated:
In my view, the Court's casual consideration both of the substantial public
policies that prompted New Jersey's repeal of the 1962 covenant, and of the
relatively inconsequential burdens that resulted for the Authority's creditors,
belies its conclusion that the State acted unreasonably in seeking to relieve its
citizens from the strictures of this earlier legislative policy.
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the covenant's repeal was minimal. 405 He also noted that the "less
restrictive alternative" standards chosen by the Court enable it to "hy-
pothesize other means of achieving some or all of the State's objectives
• ; " contrary to the traditional method of applying this test.4 7
Brennan's dissent was also significant for its historical analysis of the
police power's inalienability:
One of the fundamental premises of our popular democracy is that
each generation of representatives can and will remain responsive to
the needs and desires of those whom they represent. Crucial to this end
is the assurance that new legislators will not automatically be bound by
the policies and undertakings of earlier days.'4
Moreover, in applying this principle of conditions test, Brennan adopted
the traditional Blaisdell/C.B. & Q. analysis to assess the contract clause
validity of police power enactments:
But if a State, as here, manifestly acts in furtherance of its citizens'
general welfare, and its choice of policy, even though infringing
contract rights, is not "plainly unreasonable and arbitrary, ... our
inquiry should end:
"The question is . . . whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate
to that end." 9
This standard of review was to be applied despite Brennan's concern that
"this Court should have learned long ago that the Constitution-be it
through the Contract or Due Process Clause-can actively intrude into
such economic and policy matters only if my Brethren are prepared to
bear enormous institutional and social costs.'410
Thus, the principle of conditions has survived in the post-Olsen era as
a component of combined due process/vested contract right protection of
economic interests. Its application, however, has been skewed by the
Burger Court.
B. State Developments: Zoning and the Principle of Conditions
State courts have reacted inconsistently to the Supreme Court's post-
405. Id. at 41-42.
406. Id. at 54-55 n.17.
407. Id. Justice Brennan cited Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and
Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967).
408. 431 U.S. at 45.
409. Id. at 53 (quoting Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438
(1933), discussed in text at notes 299-316 supra).
410. Id. at 62.
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Olsen economic due process analysis.411 Although most jurisdictions
have followed the Court's lead, others continue to rely on Lochner412 as
vital precedent. In both lines of cases, however, courts have applied the
principle of conditions to uphold413 and invalidate414 police power enact-
411. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 13 (1959); Howard, supra note 357, at 879-91; Paulsen, The
Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950); Note,
Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REV. 309 (1963).
412. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), discussed in text at notes 169-75 supra.
413. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N.E. 187 (1935);
Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938). Both courts relied on the comprehen-
sive Nebbia presumption and the principle of conditions to uphold regulation of hours and
prices in the operation of barbershops. As stated in Wilson:
The police power is not static and must ever be exercised in the light of changing
conditions. To continue to apply principles in accord with circumstances no
longer existing and to refuse to curtail new evils from fear of demolishing
outworn precedents is to close the eyes to the necessities of the times and thus
fail to give to constitutional guaranties their true import.
130 Ohio St. at 297, 199 N.E. at 192. See City of Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616,
194 So. 368 (1940), invalidating an ordinance prohibiting the storage of gasoline in
specified areas of the city. The court added, however:
The right of the State to regulate a business which may become unlawful is a
continuing one, and a business lawful today may, in the future, because of
changed conditions, the growth of population, or other causes, become a menace
to the safety and public welfare and the continuance thereof must yield to the
public good.
Id. at 634-35, 194 So. at 376.
In Opinion to the Governor, 75 R.I. 54, 63 A.2d 724 (1949), the court upheld
emergency public housing legislation, stating:
[T]he police power may be exercised by the state in case of an emergency which
the legislature has found to exist as a matter of fact, and which it has declared is
causing widespread distress with resulting danger to the health, safety or morals
of the public generally . . . . To justify recourse to that [police] power, the
declaration of an emergency must rest upon findings of fact by the legislature as
to the existence of unusual circumstances which, unless temporarily relieved,
would endanger the public health, safety or morals.
Id. at 61-62, 63 A.2d at 728-29. Cf. People ex rel. Greening v. Bartholf, 388 Ill. 445, 58
N.E.2d 172 (1944) (aviation legislation); Zelney v. Murphy, 387 Il1. 492, 56 N.E.2d 754
(1944) (unemployment compensation legislation); Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers Local 18,
358 II. 239, 193 N.E. 112 (1934) (anti-injunction legislation). Although the principle of
conditions was recognized in Fenske, its application was highly circumscribed by the use
of a broad presumption of constitutionality.
414. See, e.g., City of Winston-Salem v. Southern Ry., 248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37
(1958), in which the court invalidated an ordinance allocating the full cost of rebuilding a
railroad overpass to accomodate street widening. The court found the ordinance no longer
responsive:
[W]hat was at one time regarded as an improper exercise of the police power may
now, because of changed conditions, be recognized as a legitimate exercise of
that power. . . . Similarly, a police regulation or measure, although valid when
promulgated, may become unreasonable and confiscatory in operation as a result
of later events or changed conditions.
Id. at 643, 105 S.E.2d at 41.Washington University Open Scholarship
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ments. Two recent zoning decisions are illustrative.
During the 1920s the principle of conditions played a seminal role in
determining the constitutionality of zoning enactments. 415 Following
these early decisions, land use controls became more pervasive as the
interdependence of urban conditions increased. Whereas zoning was
used originally as a mechanism for reconciling interparcel cost spillovers
within central cities, suburbanization and the concomitant balkanization
of zoning jurisdictions within interdependent metropolitan re-
gions, now cause it to impede the reconciliation of intermunicipal spill-
overs. Responding to these changed conditions, two state courts have
invalidated zoning enactments because they no longer are responsive to
prevailing conditions. In National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown
Township Board of Adjustment,416 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
invalidated a four acre minimum lot size requirement as applied to the
company's land. In Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel,417 the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the
township's entire zoning ordinance.
In National Land, the company challenged the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's minimum lot size requirement. Justice Roberts' majority
opinion detailed the municipality's history and recent development, 48 and
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Botti, 137 N.J.L. 437, 60 A.2d 318 (1948), the New Jersey
Supreme Court invalidated an emergency-based ordinance mandating the closing of
butcher shops on Mondays. It stated:
A regulation depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state
of facts to uphold it loses its force and authority upon the termination of the
emergent condition or a change in the basic facts, even though valid when passed
. . . . The operation of the regulation itself could not validly outlast the
emergency.
Id. at 439, 60 A.2d at 320. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 685, 5 So. 2d
244, 247 (1941) ("It is well settled that a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by
change in conditions to which it is applied. . . ."); Realty Revenue Corp. v. Wilson, 181
Misc. 802, 804, 44 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236 (1943) ("a statute which is valid as to one set of facts
may be invalid as to another, and one which is valid when enacted may become invalid by
change in the conditions to which it is applied."); Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R,, 138 W.
Va. 313, 75 S.E.2d 858 (1953).
415. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), discussed in text
at notes 285-95 supra; cases cited in notes 285 & 294 supra.
416. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board, -Pa.-,
382 A.2d 106 (1978); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - Pa. -, 341
A.2d 466 (1975); Appeal of Concord Township, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal
of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
417. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). See Holy Name Hosp. v. Montroy, 153 N.J.
Super. 181 (1977); International Looms, Inc. v. Jono Textile Co., 34 Conn. Sup. 599, 379
A.2d 3 (1977); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977). See generally 1975-76N.J. Supreme Court Term, 30 RUTGERs L. REV. 482,488
(1977).
418. 419 Pa. at 519-20, 215 A.2d at 605-06. Easttown Township is a suburb of Philadel-
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assessed the ordinance's validity in light of these conditions. The court,
relying on a balancing analysis, weighed the diminished value of the
company's property against the community benefits from the enact-
ment.41 9 In establishing this balance, the court accorded the zoning
ordinances a limited presumption: "[T]he burden of proof imposed upon
one who challenges the validity of a zoning regulation must never be so
onerous as to foreclose, for all practical purposes, a landowner's avenue
of redress against the infringement of constitutionally protected
rights."' 420 Moreover, zoning ordinances "must bear a substantial rela-
tionship" 42 to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
The municipality advanced five public purposes to support the enact-
ment.422 The court rejected each, and found instead an impermissible
exclusionary purpose: 423 "A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is
to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future services
cannot be held valid." ' 424 Such an ordinance denied the township's
regional responsibilities because it was unresponsive to
the demands of evolving and growing communities. . . .Zoning is a
means by which a governmental body can plan for the future- it may
not be used as a means to deny the future . . . .Zoning provisions
may not be used, however, to avoid the increased responsibilities and
economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably bring.425
The Court thus incorporated responsiveness analysis of prevailing and
predictable regional population movement into its delineation of the
power's scope.
The incorporation of responsiveness analysis of regional population
movement was determinative in the New Jersey Supreme Court's Mount
Laurel decision. In order to keep property taxes down, Mount Laurel, a
largely undeveloped suburban community, had enacted an exclusionary
ordinance fairly typical of zoning regulations in developing munici-
palities .426 Justice Hall, writing for the court, assessed the validity of this
phia under pressure of population growth not only from the central city but also from a
neighboring industrial-commercial complex.
419. Id. at 525, 215 A.2d at 608.
420. Id. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607.
421. Id. (emphasis added).
422. They were pollution control and sewage disposal, prevention of prospective
burdens on the town's system of roads, preservation of the town's rural character,
creation of a greenbelt, and preservation of historic sites. Id. at 524-30, 215 A.2d at 608-11.
423. Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 613.
424. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
425. Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.
426. The ordinance excluded low and moderate income housing, and multi-family
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purpose in light of changing conditions, including the decentralization of
population into the developing suburbs, the prevalence of exclusionary
zoning,427 and the plight of those left behind in the central cities.428
Traditionally, zoning ordinances had been upheld when merely in furth-
erance of the enacting municipality's general welfare. 429 Regional inter-
dependence, however, now precluded such a narrow interpretation of
general welfare: "[W]hen regulation does have a substantial external
impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized
and served." 4 30 Otherwise the enactment will be considered contrary to
the general welfare and, therefore, beyond the scope of the police
power.43 The enacting municipality had the burden of demonstrating the
development except when allowed by agreement with a developer in a planned unit
development, limited the number of bedrooms in that multi-family housing, and zoned
large areas of the town exclusively for industrial development. Id. at 161-73, 336 A.2d at
718-24. Its commonality among municipalities was noted by Justice Hall:
This pattern of land use regulation has been adopted for the same purpose in
developing municipality after developing municipality. Almost every one acts
solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect builds a wall around
itself to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to the tax base,
despite the location of the municipality or the demand for varied kinds of
housing. There has been no effective inter-municipal or area planning or land use
regulation.
Id. at 171, 336 A.2d at 723.
427. Id. at 183-85, 336 A.2d at 730. See Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor and Council of
Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
428. Camden, the urban center of the metropolitan region containing Mount Laurel,
was losing not only population but also commerce and industry and the jobs and tax base
they represented. Id. at 172-73, 336 A.2d at 724. Moreover, the court found "a desperate
[statewide] need for housing, especially of decent living accommodations economically
suitable for low and moderate income families." Id. at 158, 336 A.2d at 716. Although the
court referred to the housing shortage in New Jersey as a "crisis," at no point did it use
the principle of conditions as it relates to emergency situations.
429. Id. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
430. Id. The New York Court of Appeals followed Mount Laurel's explication of the
regional general welfare in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 108, 341
N.E.2d 236, 240-41, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 679 (1975).
431. 67 N.J. at 183, 336 A.2d at 730. Changing conditions scrutiny, as a component of
state substantive due process and equal protection, id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725, had had a
significant doctrinal history in New Jersey zoning cases. The Mt. Laurel court noted that
in previously upholding broadly restrictive zoning measures, it had warned: " 'If and
when conditions change, alterations in zoning restrictions and pertinent legislative and
judicial attitudes need not be long delayed.' "Id. at 177, 336 A.2d at 126 (quoting Pierro v.
Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 29, 118 A.2d 401, 408 (1955)). In addition to Pierro, the court
referred to Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1955); Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, I 1 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1955);
Lionshead Lake v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dis-
missed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
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constitutionality of an exclusionary ordinance; 4 2 it was presumptively
invalid.
Thus, reliance on the principle of changing conditions produced an
alteration in the power's scope. Zoning ordinances, previously justified
by serving the community's general welfare, were now justifiable only if
they furthered the region's general welfare. Therefore, although the
Supreme Court has virtually abandoned the principle of conditions in
federal due process scrutiny, state courts still provide a receptive forum
for definitional scrutiny.
IV. A NORMATIVE ANALYTICAL MODEL: AUTHORIZATION SCRUTINY
The foregoing doctrinal history and development of the police power
demonstrates that the judiciary has explicitly defined and delineated the
power's scope by analyzing the responsiveness of an enactment to the
conditions prevailing at the time of its assessment. The changing nature
of social and economic conditions has caused the constitutional scope of
the power to expand and contract. As a means of judicially controlling
this fluctuation, a normative model of definitional scrutiny, herein de-
nominated authorization scrutiny, is proposed.
Authorization scrutiny is a middle level review standard designed to
link the nature and scope of the police power to prevailing social and
economic conditions.433 As such, authorization scrutiny may be used to
assess an enactment's validity at the time of its promulgation as well as
its continuing validity throughout its existence. Moreover, it may be
applied either independently or as an initial component in a broader
rational relationship or balancing analysis. In the latter context, the social
benefit to be derived from the challenged enactment is first independently
derived through application of authorization scrutiny and is then balanced
against an independent evaluation of the infringement of a constitutional-
ly protected right. The extent of infringement may be measured by taking
issue, equal protection, due process, first amendment or similar analyses.
Definitional scrutiny of the police power has been applied in a variety
of ways with a variety of components. The following normative model of
432. 67 N.J. at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 728.
433. Many commentators have analyzed the relationship between law and social
change. See generally H. RoTrSCHAEFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND SocIo-ECONOMIC
CHANGE (1948); Cushman, supra note 148; Soref, The Doctrine of Reasonableness in the
Police Power, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 3 (1930); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); Wright, The Relation of Law in America to Socio-Economic
Change, 28 ARK. L. REV. 440 (1975).
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authorization scrutiny thus represents a distillation of and extrapolation
from the analytical mechanisms developed and used to produce the
desired level of review in over two centuries of definitional scrutiny
police power litigation. It implements the principle of conditions primari-
ly by manipulation of the presumption of constitutionality to provide a
link between societal change (time) and the scope of the police power. It
also relies substantially less than traditional judicial review on manipula-
tion of the degree of responsiveness required to hold an enactment
constitutional.434 By relying on this form of presumption rather than on
the degree of responsiveness, authorization scrutiny attempts to provide
"a process through which constitutional principles can be shaped both to
admit change (or stability) and to minimize the justices' discretionary
role in 'decreeing it." 435
The presumption of constitutionality, as a function of the separation of
judicial and legislative power, has been a component of constitutional
analysis since at least 18 10.436 Manipulation of the presumption has
contributed to the substantial analytical chasm between modern equal
protection's mere rationality and strict scrutiny levels of judicial re-
view. 437 Similarly, the historical development of substantive due process
has been characterized by manipulation of the presumption. While Loch-
ner438 and its progeny relied on an inverse presumption, modern substan-
tive due process cases have applied a "well-nigh conclusive ' 439 pre-
434. See Brown, supra note 147, at 105.
435. Tribe, supra note 433, at 295.
436. See cases cited in note 9 supra; Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75, 86-89; Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 143-44 (1893). Professor Karst
identifies differential application of the presumption in distinct areas of constitutional
assessment:
There is not just one presumption of constitutionality; there are several, of
varying vigor and applicability. Thus the Supreme Court typically pays less
deference to the legislative judgment underlying state economic regulations
when they are challenged on commerce grounds than when they are challenged
as violations of due process. So also, the Court tends to give a greater presump-
tion of validity to congressional legislation than it does to that of the states. Some
degree of "preferred position" for First Amendment freedoms over other
constitutional values is firmly established, even though the Court has now
repudiated earlier suggestions that legislation restricting speech is presumed to
be invalid. Finally, when there is no judgment by a legislature at all, as in cases of
abuse of power by law enforcement officials, there is little justification for any
presumption of constitutionality.
Karst, supra, at 87.
437. See Gunther, supra note 360, at 20-21.
438. 198 U.S. 45 (1904), discussed in text at notes 169-75 supra.
439. Justice Douglas used the phrase "well-nigh conclusive" to describe the presump-
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sumption of constitutionality. In these examples of extreme manipula-
tion, the judicial balance has either been skewed heavily in favor of the
state (mere rationality equal protection and post-1940 substantive due
process) or heavily against it (strict scrutiny equal protection and pre-
1933 Lochner-type substantive due process).
Extreme examples do not, however, exhaust the variety of available
formulae for applying the presumption of constitutionality."' A form of
middle level presumption requires the plaintiff" to meet his burden of
persuasion by clear and convincing proof of unconstitutionality rather
than by a preponderance or greater weight of proof. This form of
presumption, although marginally skewed in favor of the state, di-
minishes the heavy biases characteristic of the extreme formulations.
Without regard to the level of persuasion, the presumption of constitu-
tionality has "one vital difference from the ordinary evidentiary pre-
sumption . . . [t]he facts to be established are those bearing on the
appropriateness of the legislation.' 442 That is, the presumption of valid-
ity affects the ultimate issue of constitutionality. Under authorization
scrutiny, the enactment's constitutionality depends upon its responsive-
ness to prevailing conditions. Responsiveness is thus the ultimate issue.
In authorization scrutiny cases, the presumption of constitutionality is the
equivalent of a presumption of responsiveness. Responsiveness is, in
turn, a function of the relationship between the prevailing social and
economic conditions at which the enactment is directed and its legislative
purpose or object. These two components of authorization scrutiny
tion of constitutionality afforded legislative enactments in post-1937 economic and prop-
erty rights cases in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), discussed in text at notes
363-66 supra.
440. See Karst, supra note 436, at 88. Professor Karst identifies three distinct formulae
for application of the presumption:
Formulas for the presumption of constitutionality vary. It is sometimes said
that a statute is presumed valid if its supporters produce evidence of facts
supporting the view that it is appropriate legislation, even though the statute's
opponents produce countervailing evidence. Another version which seems less
formidable for the opponents presumes the statute valid unless contrary evi-
dence is produced "showing that the evil did not exist or that the remedy was
inappropriate." The most sweeping formula would make the opponents' task
nearly impossible; the statute is presumed valid "if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived" which would make the legislation appropriate.
Id. These three formulae may, in turn, be roughly analogized to the clear and convincing
standard, the preponderance standard, and the "well-nigh conclusive" standard.
441. Throughout this presentation of authorization scrutiny, the term plaintiff will be
used to refer to the individual citizen or group of citizens alleging the unconstitutionality
of the legislation in issue.
442. Karst, supra note 436, at 88. See Corwin, supra note 8, at 665.
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constitute prerequisites to the application of the presumption of constitu-
tionality. When the legislature not only substantiates its assessment of
prevailing conditions with evidence derived from comprehensive legisla-
tive hearings or commission investigations but also articulates its pur-
pose, the challenged enactment is accorded a presumption of responsive-
ness (constitutionality). Once the presumption is triggered, plaintiff may
rebut it only by establishing clear and convincing proof of invalidity.
When either substantiated legislative facts or articulated legislative pur-
pose are not in evidence, the presumption of responsiveness is not
triggered. In its absence, a preponderance of proof prevails.
Use of substantiated legislative facts and articulated legislative pur-
pose as triggers for different levels of presumption presents a number of
advantages. Both are the relatively objective product of fact-finding and
are within the initial and continuing control of the legislature. Thus, to
retain the presumption, the legislature must periodically reassess and, if
necessary, amend its legislation. Moreover, the authorization scrutiny
triggers cut across categorizations of constitutional rights and classifica-
tions and are applicable whether or not the rights at stake are fundamental
or the classifications presented are suspect. Furthermore, and perhaps
most significantly, they provide a means by which the presumption may
be manageably and predictably manipulated through time.
The process of authorization scrutiny should begin with judicial docu-
mentation of the social and economic conditions at which the challenged
enactment is directed. 43 When assessing recently enacted legislation, the
court should rely on the legislature's statement of prevailing conditions
so long as that statement is substantiated by investigative commission
findings or comprehensive legislative hearings. This statement of legisla-
tive facts not only meets the state's burden of going forward with
evidence, it also provides the first trigger necessary to generate the
presumption of responsiveness. The judicial balance between the plain-
tiff and the state is, therefore, skewed in the legislature's favor. Depend-
ing upon the depth of its research and the sophistication of its analysis of
443. Many commentators have described and analyzed the presentation of social and
economic data in constitutional litigation. See generally Bikl6, Judicial Determination of
Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L.
REV. 6 (1924); Karst, supra note 436; Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Respon-
sibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1952); Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of
Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1948);
Note, The Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 631 (1936).
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prevailing conditions, the legislature's statement of conditions may be
extremely difficult and expensive for the plaintiff to overcome. If,
however, no statement of legislative facts exists, the court should make
its own determination of prevailing conditions. In doing so, the court
should rely on the evidence of social and economic conditions developed
in the litigation rather than on its own imagination. The court should
neither conceive of any state of facts which could support the enact-
ment's validity, nor should it require the state to demonstrate special or
exceptional conditions. That is, in the absence of legislative facts, courts
should apply neither a presumption of validity nor of invalidity. Plaintiff
may thus rebut the legislature's evidence of prevailing conditions and
meet his burden of persuasion by establishing the existence of contrary
conditions by a preponderance of proof. This analytical structure, there-
fore, insures a more evenly balanced assessment and thus increases
plaintiff's likelihood of success.
When an enactment is assessed for continuing validity, the passage of
time and concomitant change in the social and economic conditions
preclude continued utilization of a presumption of responsiveness. Be-
cause there may have been both a general change in conditions and a
specific change in those conditions at which the enactment was originally
directed, the legislature's statement of circumstances is no longer pre-
sumptively accurate. Under authorization scrutiny, responsiveness must
exist at the time of the judicial assessment. Thus, as to the ultimate issue
of continued responsiveness, no presumption of constitutionality may be
applied. In the absence of contemporary substantiated legislative facts,
either party may prevail by establishing a preponderance of proof.
In both the initial constitutional assessment of recently enacted police
power legislation and the assessment of an enactment's continuing
constitutional validity, therefore, authorization scrutiny relies on the
relationship in time between legislative fact-finding and prevailing social
and economic conditions to establish the first prerequisite to the pre-
sumption of constitutionality and to allocate the burden of persuasion
among the parties.
Having ascertained the relevant social conditions, the court should
then separate the legislative purpose from the means chosen to effectuate
it. In the context of authorization scrutiny, legislative purpose means the
social harm to be prevented or the social benefit to be promoted. In this
regard, legislative purpose or object must be distinguished from either
legislative motivation or "furtherance of the public health, safety, morals
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or general welfare," i.e., the constitutional formulation of the permissi-
ble police power purposes.
Legislative purpose constitutes the second prerequisite to the presump-
tion's application. If available, the court should rely on the legislative
statement of purpose. When the enactment's object is not so evidenced,
however, the court should require evidentiary presentation to determine it
as a factual (not constitutional) matter. No presumption of any kind
should be applied. The legislature should not be required to demonstrate
a "compelling state interest" or an "important public purpose," nor
should the court deferentially conceive any supportable purpose. Thus,
either party may prevail by establishing a preponderance of proof.
The court should juxtapose its findings of prevailing conditions and
legislative purpose to determine responsiveness and, therefore, constitu-
tionality. If legislative facts have been recently substantiated and legisla-
tive purpose has been articulated, the presumption of responsiveness is
triggered and plaintiff's burden of persuasion is elevated to a clear and
convincing standard. In the absence of either trigger, a mere preponder-
ance of proof will prevail.
Authorization scrutiny's manipulation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality provides a relatively mechanical and manageable standard by
which a middle level burden of persuasion may be used to apply as a link
between the constitutional scope of the police power and the evolution of
social and economic conditions. By providing a means for judicial use of
legislative fact-finding to assess prevailing conditions, authorization
scrutiny also produces an incentive to increased legislative reliance on
more comprehensive data to support its enactments.
Having allocated the burden of persuasion through manipulation of
middle level presumptions, a court applying authorization scrutiny must
then translate that allocation into standards of responsiveness. Determi-
nation of these standards may be characterized as the search for the
appropriate degree of responsiveness on a continuum described by re-
sponsiveness and non-responsiveness. The middle level nature of the
authorization scrutiny model establishes the appropriate boundaries on
that continuum within which judicial discretion in particularizing the
required degree of responsiveness is exercised. A range of points around
the continuum's center point would meet the middle level standard,
Within these boundaries, judicial articulation of the required degree of
responsiveness, unless uniform in all cases, necessarily involves some
means of classifying types of legislation or protected rights. A number of
classification schemes, each with its attendant costs to analytical consis-
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tency and predictability in determining constitutional policy, are avail-
able.
The use of classifications based on type of legislation or protected right
in determinations of the required degree of responsiveness is not without
historical precedent. Emergency enactments have customarily been held
to a higher degree of responsiveness than other less intrusive forms of
police power legislation. These cases, however, constitute a distinct
subset with no ready analog among other groupings of police power
legislation.
A second historical means of classifying police power enactments
involves a perceived dichotomy between harms and benefits. As noted
above, the nineteenth century police power only incorporated authority to
prevent harms to the community and its inhabitants. Indeed, this limita-
tion to "self-protective" legislation provided a fundamental component
of nineteenth century definitional scrutiny. By the first decade of the
twentieth century, however, the constitutional definition of the power
had come to incorporate not only self-protective legislation but also
legislation designed to promote the general welfare, i.e., to prospectively
generate benefits for the community and its inhabitants. This dichotomy
between harm-preventing and benefit-producing legislation could serve
as a means of allocating differential degrees of responsiveness. Benefit-
promoting enactments, having less historical justification because less
closely linked to an original source of the police power, would have to be
more highly responsive than protective enactments. The harms/benefits
dichotomy is, however, difficult to draw with precision because analysis
of the dichotomy depends largely on the perspective of the reviewing
party. Moreover, since its incorporation into the police power lexicon,
the term "general welfare" has incorporated the traditional self-protec-
tive purposes, thus obscuring the dichotomy between harms and benefits.
The degree of responsiveness could also be analytically linked to the
degree of infringement of constitutionality protected individual rights.
A continuum of infringement could be aligned with the continuum of
responsiveness. The more severe the deprivation, the higher the degree
of responsiveness. Use of this continuum, however, presents two signifi-
cant difficulties. First, because authorization scrutiny involves analysis
of legislative purpose, it presents historically documented risks of judi-
cial policy abuse. Second, the assessment of the degree of infringement
should be made through some form of independent analysis. Assessment
of social benefit (intrinsic analysis) and individual infringement (extrin-
sic analysis) should be analytically separated to prevent inadvertent and
premature skewing of the balancing process.
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The required degree of responsiveness could also be linked with the
fundamental interest/suspect classification system. A higher degree of
responsiveness could be required when the interest infringed is funda-
mental and/or the classification used is suspect. This method of categori-
zation has, however, proved difficult to apply with certainty and preci-
sion in equal protection analysis.r' 4 Indeed, one of the advantages of the
manipulation of the presumption in authorization scrutiny is its use of
easily definable triggers. Moreover, reliance on the fundamental inter-
est/suspect classification system would again make intrinsic and extrinsic
scrutiny interdependent.
Given the difficulties of creating predictable, consistent standards
against which to measure responsiveness, a relatively narrow range of
points near the center of the continuum of responsiveness is called for in
the authorization scrutiny model. The degree of responsiveness required
should reflect only the differential in the burden of persuasion produced
by application of the presumption of responsiveness.
V. CONCLUSION
Authorization scrutiny, encompassing both the principle of conditions
and an analytical framework establishing middle level scrutiny through
manipulation of the presumption of constitutionality by means of objecti-
fiable triggers, is thus an attempt to incorporate the progression of social
and economic conditions into constitutional assessment of the police
power. In so doing, authorization scrutiny reflects the continuing evolu-
tion of definitional scrutiny as a means of ascertaining the constitutional
scope of legislative authority.
444. See generally San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S 1
(1973); Gunther, supra note 360.
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